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Introduction 
I  argue  here  that  economic activity fell considerably in the first three 
decades  of  Paraguay's early national period,  below levels it had attained in 
the late colonial period and would attain again only after mid nineteenth 
century.  I  attribute this economic depression to regional political 
fragmentation and the institutional regression it triggered.  In the  1810s,  the 
United Provinces of the River Plate sought  to keep  the  former  provinces of  the 
Viceroyalty of  the River Plate under  a  single federal  government,  but  failed 
to prevent  Paraguay's early secession.  They then imposed trade blockades  and 
military threats whose  economic  and political effects on  Paraguay were 
profound:  revenues  from  taxation of foreign trade fell,  scale  economies  in the 
provision of  defense  and  justice vanished,  a  standing Army  emerged,  public 
finance  crises worsened,  and mercantilist regulations  were  heightened.  The 
fiscal  burden and  transactions costs in general  increased.  Proponents  of 
federation,  more  representative governments,  and  freer trade progressively 
declined,  while  supporters of secession,  political absolutism,  and government 
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regulation became  ever more  prominent.  Producers  and exporters of  forest goods 
and relatively larger landowners  constituted the majority of  the first group, 
while the small peasantry is generally thought  to have  made  up  the bulk of the 
second group.  In the  1820s,  blockade  relaxations exacerbated state economic 
intervention,  which  included a  substantial redistribution towards  the state of 
property rights in land.  In the 1830s,  renewed blockading had more  than 
proportional negative effects on  economic activity,  which  remained below late 
colonial levels at least until international waterways  became  freely navigable 
shortly after mid-century.  Colonial  absolutism and mercantilism may be said to 
have  been restored with a  vengeance.  Long  run economic  performance worsened.  1 
Of  interest,  then,  is the behavior of an originally fairly open,  largely 
agricultural,  relatively distant colonial economy which initially was  a  part 
of  the broad  economic  region surrounding the mines  of Alto  Peru but  which 
later became  a  relatively isolated political unit of  the subregion defined by 
the  Paraguay-Parana-Uruguay river system.  One  might  expect  economic  issues 
arising in this context to be  amenable  to treatment with the tools of 
international trade,  land and locational rent,  and regional  theories.  2  Late 
colonial  economic activity involved substantial factor mobility and  may  be 
thought  of in terms  of  the staple theory of economic  growth.  3  The  early 
national  economy,  by contrast,  involved little factor mobility,  and is 
therefore better conceptualized in terms of Ricardo's  comparative advantage 
theorem.  Morever,  the  events  I  seek to account  for are both economic  and 
political in nature and may  be  better understood,  I  submit,  by resorting to 
recent  advances  in political economy.  Particularly useful are 
neoinstitutionalist contributions to the  theory of property rights and of the 
predatory state.  4  Trade  expansion and contraction bring about  changes  in 
political coalitions which may  be  analyzed using Rogowski's  extension of the 
/ 3 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem along collective action lines proposed by Olson.  5 
In this view,  trade expansion will benefit owners  of abundant  factors  and 
producers  of goods  using  those factors  intensively,  which  in economies  where 
land is abundant  relative to labour and capital will  lead to to  landowners 
aggressively seeking to further trade liberalisation vis-a-vis defensive 
labourers and capitalists;  trade contraction,  on  the other hand,  may  be 
expected to benefit owners  of relatively scarce factors  and of goods produced 
using scarce  factors  intensively;  that is,  trade contraction may  be  expected 
to benefit small peasants,  labourers,  and artisans,  who  will  seek protection, 
at the expense of  landowners,  who  will oppose it. 6  Changes  in the 
distribution of property rights and the institutional structure that affect 
incentive systems  and economic  performance  have been linked to public  finance 
crises.  Particularly useful  in this connection is North and weingast's  recent 
analysis of seventeenth century England,  which argues  that budgetary crises, 
in the absence of an Army  and of  crown  lands,  forced absolute monarchs  to 
trade  revenue  for rule making  power with Parliament.  Constitutional rule 
facilitated the development  of a  market  in government  securities and,  later, 
in private securities.  The  capital market that developed as  a  result helped 
the eventual  launching of the Industrial Revolution.?  These,  then,  are the 
theoretical  foundations  on which  I  will build my  analysis of the  Paraguayan 
case. 
In contrast,  the revisionist school has  advanced  a  diametrically opposed 
interpretive view of  Paraguay during the 1810-1840  span and  the early national 
period as  a  whole.  Dominant  in the literature since at least the late 
seventies,  its major  hypotheses are consistent with an alternative theoretical 
vantage point.  One of the latest proponents of these hypotheses has  summarized 
them as  follows: 
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"after gaining its independence  in 1813  this republic experienced an 
original process of development.  The  experience began with a  radical 
agrarian reform which concentrated most  land in the hands  of  the state. 
Rented out at low cost,  this vast state domain permitted the 
establishment of an important class of small  farmers.  Yields per hectare 
grew. ,,8 
In this view  "a social revolution permitted the mobilisation of  an important 
part of  the agricultural surplus with a  view to rapid accumulation in the 
modern sector of the economy."  The  process  was  "crowned,  from  1852  to  1865,  by 
a  spectacular industrialisation effort."g This agrarian reform and 
industrialisation effort were  led by the state,  and scholars have  therefore 
characterised the period as  an early instance of  "state-socialism."  These 
hypotheses  are purportedly supported by a  body of quantitative evidence not 
previously available and are said to be consistent with dependency theory. 
cannot here discuss  the evolution of the revisionist school  or the 
historiography of the  1810-1840 period.  I  will only cite the major revisionist 
works  in English that concern this period and are supported by archival 
research,  which are those of White,  Williams,  and Reber.  10  No  critical 
assessment of  Paraguay's revisionist school is yet available nor is there a 
recent historiographical discussion of  the literature on the period at 
issue.  11 
The major  proponent of the revisionist-dependency school  for  the period 
of concern here is still White.  His  archival research furnished  a  data base 
that has  been adopted by most  subsequent  contributors to the literature, 
friend or foe,  and  forms  the core of the overall data base currently available 
on the early national period as  a  whole.  12  On  close examination,  however, 
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these data  turn out to offer only weak  support  for the revisionist hypotheses 
concerning the period at issue.  13  Furthermore,  they suffer from  shortcomings 
that appear to have gone unnoticed.  I  will  show here that even if these 
shortcomings are disregarded the quantitative data set available for 1810-1840 
does  not  support claims  of a  social revolution,  state-led agrarian reform,  and 
state-led socialism during the period in question.  I  will also show that to 
the extent the  evidence is reliable it more  strongly supports the alternative 
hypotheses  of this paper,  which are consistent with additional evidence  in 
secondary sources,  as well  as  with new  evidence for the preceding and 
subsequent periods.  14 
I  attempt to support these claims  in the sequel.  To  that end  I  have 
organised this paper as  follows:  section one  reviews  the late colonial period, 
in order to provide a  benchmark by reference to which later changes  in 
political and economic  structure and performance may  be  judged.  Section two 
consists of  three subsections:  subsection 2a describes in greater detail the 
failed attempts at federation of the early 1810'Sj  subsection  2b  relates  the 
successful efforts of secessionists to prevail against external and internal 
foes  by increasing the size of the army and moving progressively closer to 
absolutist rulej  subsection 2c first discusses  the blockade-induced economic 
recession and public  finance  crisis,  which worsened as  the 1810's wore  onj  it 
then describes the military reform of 1819  and  the so-called Great Conspiracy 
of  1820,  whose  successful  repression marked the secessionist regime's 
definitive consolidation.  Section three considers  the mounting public finance 
crisis of  the early 1820's,  the  increase in international trade consequent 
upon the temporary relaxation of the blockades  in the mid  1820's,  the 
subsequent  land expropriations by the state,  the rise of state ranches,  and 
the greater resort by the state to coerced labour that characterised that 
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decade.  Section four considers the renewal  of the blockades  in the 1830's, 
whose  recessionary effects were magnified by the now  state economic 
intervention.  Section five draws  conclusions. 
Section 1.  Late  Colonial  Trade  Expansion,  ~nstitutiona1 Change,  and  Economic 
Growth. 
In this section  I  draw on  recent  research results to paint  a  picture of 
the late colonial  economy which portrays the period as  one of substantial 
economic  expansion,  due  mostly to exogenous  economic  stimuli and institutional 
innovation.  As  a  result,  by the early nineteenth century economic  conditions 
and domestic political alignments differed from  those of  a  century earlier. 
Economic activity quickened in Europe as well  as in the European 
periphery as the seventeenth century crisis lifted.  Economic  growth  resumed 
earliest in Holland and England,  partly as  a  result of institutional 
innovation.  Particularly important in this connection was  the exchange of 
revenue  for  rule-making power between sovereign and Parliament that 
characterised transitions  from absolute to constitutional monarchies. 
Constitutional rule encouraged the development of capital markets,  helping the 
Industrial Revolution eventually get under way  in that and other ways.1S 
British contraband trade with the peripheral Spanish colonies of the  southern 
cone of  South America  increased in the eighteenth century,  and begun to erode 
the generalised economic  depression that had characterised that region for 
much  of  the seventeenth century.  The  center of gravity of the colonial  economy 
shifted from the  inland mines  of Potosi,  to Buenos Aires,  the port through 
which  the  resource  intensive silver and other output of the  region could most 
easily be  traded for European manufactures,  which were  comparatively more 
capital  and labour intensive.  16  To  increased British competition for its 7 
empire's  economic  rents,  Spain responded with the  Bourbonic  Reforms,  which 
were partly economic  and partly administrative in nature.  The  Edict of  Free 
Trade  (1778)  further encouraged economic activity,  in Paraguay by lifting some 
of the  inter-provincial trade hindrances  imposed by the Hapsburgs  early in the 
seventeenth century.  Administratively,  the reforms  included the creation of 
the Viceroyalty of the River Plate,  with Buenos  Aires  as its seat.  Government 
by intendants  improved tax collections and the delivery of government 
services,  defense  included:  the  Buenos  Aires garrisons were  reinforced by 
larger silver subsidies  from  the Potosi  treasury and men  from  the outlying 
provinces,  Paraguay among  them. l7  There,  a  corps of semi-professional, 
salaried officers drawn  from  among  the scions of old land-owning families  took 
over  the  leadership of the militias.  ls 
Exports of Paraguay's main staple,  yerba mate,  increased particularly 
rapidlYi  those of hardwoods  and tobacco increased as well,  though not as 
rapidly.  Asuncion yerba exports in 1776  were only 26,429 arrobas but averaged 
195,102  arrobas per year  from  1792  to 1796  and  271,322  arrobas per year  from 
1803  to 1807.  The  rising regional  trade increased demand for transportation 
(riverain as well  as overland),  and the rapidly growing city of Buenos  Aires 
required hardwoods  for  construction and furniture.  Imports  increased as well 
but they remained substantially below exports.  The  Province enjoyed a  balance 
of trade surplus and an  inflow of specie.  l9 
Increased exports raised the derived demand for  inputs of  labour,  land, 
and cattle,  as well  as  defense.  As  the price of  labour rose,  the state better 
enforced a  17th Century policy to grant no  new  encomiendas  and to force  vacant 
ones  to revert to the crown.  For all practical purposes,  private encomiendas 
thus  came  to their final  demise,  and they were  legally abolished in 1803.  2Q 
However,  coerced indigenous  labour lingered on,  since the  crown  assigned the 
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retrieved encomiendas  to state enterprises like the  tobacco  monopoly and the 
naval  stores factory,  or to private enterprises it sought to encourage,  like 
the shipyards set up by Basque  immigrants.  The  colonial administration 
subsidized these private enterprises by assigning  them  Indians  workers  who 
were  paid wages  lower than those prevailing in the market.  While state 
enterprises relied more  heavily on coerced indigenous  labour,  African slaves 
predominated in the private sector.  That  some  private encomiendas  may  have 
persisted after they were  legally abolished is suggested by the fact that 
after Spanish rule ended,  an early national government  reiterated the 
encomiendas'  evolution,  in 1812.  African slavery remained  in force  as  well, 
both de  jure and de  facto.  21 
Rising  wages  -in the yerba industry in particular- also contributed to 
voluntary migratory movements.  There  was  a  comparatively large  immigration 
from other provinces as  well as  intra-provincial migration,  of landless 
peasants  to the yerba area in particular.  New  towns  were  formed,  the land 
frontier was  pushed farther out.  22  As  demand  for yerba  increased and wages 
rose,  a  greater number of free peasants  tended to devote  a  greater part of 
their time to working  for  wages  in the yerba  trade.  The  old custom of growing 
two  crops per year,  consequently,  was  progressively abandoned. 23 
Staple production and transportation required land and cattle as  well. 
Paraguay's  royal  forests were  the main  source of yerba mate  and wood  for  the 
viceroyaltYi  thus,  yerba gathering,  logging,  shipbuilding,  and cartbuilding 
increased at several points along the Paraguay river.  Land  inputs into yerba 
mate or hardwood production typically were not privately owned since  they grew 
mostly on  crown  lands.  Entrepreneurs  who  wished to exploit resources  owned by 
the  crown  could simply buy  a  license to that end.  Licensing conditions  were 
costly to enforce,  however,  and yerba mate  and hardwood forests  were exploited 9 
much  as  a  commonly  owned  resource.  Greater yerba harvesting and  logging thus 
led to deforestation,  consistent with expectations based on the  economic 
theory of  common  property resource use.  24  Tobacco,  on the other hand,  was  the 
main  cash crop of mestizo,  guarani-speaking small  farmers,  who  grew it 
alongside  subsistence crops  on their privately owned  farms. 25 
Yerba production and  hard-wood  logging also required large inputs  of 
cattle.  In turn,  cattle raising required grazing lands,  which were  available 
in the south east and in the north.  Private owners  of herds  could rent  these 
grazing lands  from  the crown or come  to privately own  them  through royal 
grants.  Privately owned  ranches  were  formed,  in the south  from  lands  and 
cattle abandoned by the Jesuits.  Azara observed that  "ranches in Paraguay were 
smaller than in Argentina,  and the cows  tamer and fatter."  However,  the 
absence of surface salt  ("barreros n )  and the  climate itself made  cattle 
raising relatively more difficult in Paraguay than in more  southern provinces 
of  the viceroyalty.  Thus,  late colonial  Paraguay was  a  net  importer of cattle. 
One  would  expect  land rents  to appear as  export  demand  for  land-intensive 
staples and cattle expanded and population increased,  and  evidence to that 
effect can be  found  dating back  to the 1780'S.26 
The  eighteenth century expansion of the yerba and cattle frontiers 
caused conflicts with equestrian Indians which required that forts  be built. 
To  help defray the costs of providing defense  the state sought  to establish 
royal  ranches  on the vast royal  lands;  "estancias del  Rey"  emerged where 
troops  could raise horses  and cattle and grow crops,  thus helping to equip and 
feed  themselves.  The  colonial administration remunerated military commanders 
in land,  granted according to rank.  For this reason,  as  well  as because of 
their access  to  indigenous  labour,  military commanders  became  relatively 
prominent  among  cattle ranchers.  27 10 
Increased production and exports attracted foreign capital.  Greater 
domestic  and  foreign trade raised the  demand  for financial  services;  these  had 
previously been  furnished by the Church,  but  in the wake  of  the Reforms  the 
state itself strove to furnish several  types of financial  services,  a  good 
example  of which were  the so-called "libranzas." Rapidly rising exports  led to 
a  surplus  in the balance of trade,  which was  reflected in a  net  inflow of 
specie,  absorbed partly by the greater volume of trade and partly by  a  price 
level  increase.  That  a  considerable inflation may  have  been observed is 
consistent with the fact that landowning families appear to have  held 
significant hoards of silver plate.  Conversely,  such hoarding  -by decreasing 
the stock of money- may  have kept  inflation below levels it might otherwise 
have  reached.  28  Clearly,  economic  conditions in Paraguay in the first decade 
of the nineteenth century had  improved substantially relative to the late 
1770's,  when  a  royal  inspector reported that the Province  "needed redemption." 
Depending upon  whether one takes as  a  benchmark the first decade of the 
nineteenth century,  as  do  I,  or the late 1770s,'  as  does  White,  the early 
national period will appear in a  very different light.  In the first case,  the 
contrast with the late colonial period is much greater than in the  second. 
Estimates  of  late colonial provincial product are as yet unavailable,  but  one 
can say without  much hesitation that late colonial  economic activity far 
outstripped that of the early national period.  29 
During  the late colonial period,  the old land-owning families  and the 
newly arrived immigrants  entered into a  mutually beneficial division of  labour 
and  intermarried.  The  landowners  raised cattle in the countryside while  the 
immigrants  concentrated on urban  commercial activities,  though neither 
appears  to have  specialised completely.  However,  the  immigrants'  influence on 
the Asuncion cabildo tended to increase at the expense of  the landowners  who 11 

had  formerly  dominated it,  on  account  of which  some  conflicts occurred between 
them.  The  colonial  economy continued to boom  until the European wars  disrupted 
trade.  3o 
The  nature of provincial political intercourse changed as  a  result of 
the late colonial economic  expansion,  which  became  more  rapid after the 
Bourbonic  Reforms.  Paraguay had previously been  a  highly militarised province, 
because it was  located on  the empire's Portuguese  and  Indian frontiersj  it had 
also been a  fairly unruly colony,  because military power  -in addition to being 
fairly high- was  relatively evenly distributed among  the settlers.  The  crown 
had  -for budgetary reasons- delegated its defense  responsibilities onto  the 
settlers in exchange  for  "encomiendas  de  indios,"  which were  comparatively 
numerous  and relatively small.  31  In addition,  due  to the relatively greater 
distances that separated Paraguay from Spain,  this province's settlers had 
been authorized to elect their own  governors in emergencies subject only to 
royal confirmation,  a  right they frequently exercised the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries.  However,  the province lost that right in the 1730's, 
after the ill-fated "Comuneros  Revolt."  From  then on,  only the colonial 
administration named  and  removed governors.  Furthermore,  the Bourbons' 
determined effort to eliminate the decaying  encomienda  system implied that the 
military system would have  to be  reformed as well.  As  the encomiendas 
progressively disappeared,  the self-financed encomendero-Ied militias gave  way 
to a  semi-professional officer corps  largely paid out of  royal  revenues.  In 
1801,  the old  "urbano"  system was  strengthened by the  "filiado"  system,  whose 
salaried officers  carne  from  among  the most prominent  creole landowning  and 
encomendero  families.  As  already noted,  the encomiendas  were  outlawed shortly 
thereafter,  in 1803.  The  Reforms  centralised political power  in the colonial 
bureaucracy and reorganised the military structure so that it more  closely 12 
resembled that of  a  standing army.  Absolutism increased and coercive power 
became  more  concentrated in the hands  of  the state.  No  revolt comparable to 
that of the  "Comuneros"  again arose until the early nineteenth century.32 
In addition,  the expansion of foreign trade altered traditional 
political cleavages.  Increased yerba harvesting and cattle ranching  improved 
the  fortunes  of pursuers of those activities,  but had deleterious effects on 
agriculture,  that of  tobacco  in particular.  Rising wages  in the yerba  industry 
bid some  labourers  away  from  tobacco growers,  who  were also negatively 
affected because the Real  Renta  monopolised tobacco exports.  Expanding cattle 
herds  could not but have negative externalities on peasant plantings in the 
era before barbed wire.  33 
Section 2. 

Collapse of Federation,  Rise  and Consolidation of Secession,  1811-1820. 

This  section analyzes  in terms  of the proposed theoretical  framework  the 
process  by which political coalitions and their relative strengths altered 
during the course of  the 1810's.  It first considers  how  a  coalition that 
favored more  representative government,  freer trade,  and  federation seized 
political power  from  the  Spanish colonial administration after Napoleon's 
invasion of Spain,  but collapsed relatively quickly.  The  resulting trade 
blockades and threats of  invasion then led to a  growing militarisation and 
absolute  rule which  favored secession and economic  statism.  The  deepening 
economic  contraction and an army  reorganisation designed to strengthen 
absolutist rule in turn led to the Great  Conspiracy of  1820,  its repression, 
and the definitive consolidation of absolute rule. 
a)Following Ferdinand VII's fall,  Buenos  Aires  sent military expeditions 
to Paraguay and Alto  Peru to subdue  loyalist forces  there and keep  the old 13 
viceroyalty of the River Plate united under its leadership.  These  expeditions 
may  have been dispatched not because royalist  foes  necessarily posed a  serious 
military threat to the Buenos Aires  army but to maintain the  flow of subsidies 
those  regions provided the port,  silver from Bolivia and men  from  Paraguay in 
particular.  Thus,  the expeditions may  have been prompted by both political and 
economic  imperatives,  including among  the latter that of maintaining the 
subsidy aspect of  the late colonial public  finance  structure.  34 
The  expeditionary forces  fought  twice against the  Paraguayan officers of 
the  new  filiado corps  and militias under their command,  who  had rallied to the 
royalist cause at the Spanish governor's urging.  Early in the first battle, 
the  invading armies  appeared on the verge of victory,  so much  so that the 
Spanish governor of  Paraguay abandoned the battlefield and the royalist 
community attempted to flee Asuncion by boat.  The  Paraguayan officers and 
militias,  however,  despite being owed  several month's  back pay,  remained on 
the field and eventually repelled the invasion.  Their behavior need not puzzle 
us,  however.  These creole officers reportedly had been predominantly recruited 
from  among  local  land-owning families  who  had economically benefited  from  the 
Bourbonic  Reforms  both directly and indirectly.  Furthermore,  many  of  these 
officers and militia men  had participated in the defense of Montevideo and 
Buenos  Aires,  suffering grievous  losses.  By  some  estimates,  these may  have  ran 
as  high as  70%.35  They were  understandably concerned,  therefore,  about 
reports that the  Buenos Aires  forces'  real aim  was  to recruit for  the Bolivian 
campaign. 
After defeating the Buenos Aires expeditionaries,  however,  these  same 
officers are said to have  fraternised with the Argentine  commander,  Belgrano, 
and to have  come  to share his political and economic  ideas.  They  subsequently 
planned to depose  the Spanish governor by a  coup,  to keep  him  from  "turning 
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the  Province over to a  foreign power,"  an allusion to the  Portuguese  crown 
exiled in Brazil.  Originally scheduled to coincide with the first anniversary 
of  the Buenos  Aires  coup of  25  May  1810,  the  coup  was  moved  up to the 14-15 
May  1811  for tactical reasons.  Political power  initially fell  for the most 
part onto the hands  of the senior military officers,  who  proceeded to 
appropriate the outstanding cash in government vaults for back  pay.36  The 
Triumvirate that followed  included the  deposed Spanish governor,  a  Peninsular 
officer,  and  the cabildo representative to the Spanish Junta Suprema  Central 
Gubernativa,  a  well-respected "criollo"  lawyer  from  whom  more  would be  heard, 
Francia.  However,  the military officers soon balked at the presence of 
Spaniards  in the government,  and at their prompting the Congress  of  June  1811 
named  a  new,  expanded Junta Superior Gubernativa that included two  of the 
creole military leaders,  one  representative each from  the mercantile  community 
and  the clergy,  and Francia.  37  There is evidence of  a  close association 
between Francia and  the Asuncion cabildo,  but White  claims  that Francia was  an 
"at large"  representative.  38  Analysts distinguish three political tendencies 
at this time,  "realistas,"  "portenistas, "  and  "nacionalistas."  Among 
royalists,  Vargas  Pena  includes  a  Carlotist party,  of which  he  contends 
Francia was  a  member.  The  royalist party may  not unreasonably be  supposed to 
have  included some  who  were  loyal to Carlota,  Ferdinand VII's sister and  wife 
of Portugal's Joao,  then in Brazil.  After her brother's abdication,  she had  a 
claim on the  Spanish throne.  Vargas  Pena's argument  seems  consistent with 
Francia's functions  in the colonial administration and the notion that he  had 
no  role in planning or executing the coup of the  14-15  May.39  Also  among  the 
royalists were  some  of  the military.4o 
Only the military officers and the mercantile community's  representative 
remained in the Junta  in 1812,  the clergy's representative having been  forced 
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to withdraw by Francia,  who  later withdrew himself.  This Junta's paramount 
concerns appear to have been  improving education,  extending municipal 
government,  reducing taxes  on the  indigenous population,  innovating  the 
transportation technology,  and maintaining good relations with neighbouring 
provinces while at the  same  time  securing provincial borders.41  The  Congress 
of  1811  and  the Junta Superior Gubernativa initially looked favorably upon  a 
possible federation with Buenos  Aires,  provided the port agreed to dissolve 
the still remaining  impediments  to trade  -most  importantly the  tobacco 
monopoly  and  the  regulations that hindered free navigation to and  from 
regional markets  down  river and beyond- and to resolve the issue of Paraguay's 
contribution to the military draft.  The pressure of military imperatives 
forced  Buenos  Aires  to accept  what  were essentially Asunci6n's  terms,  and  an 
agreement  was  signed.42 
However,  the agreement dissolved fairly shortly amidst mutual  charges 
that neither party had kept its end of the bargain,  i.e.,  of opportunistic 
behavior.  Buenos Aires  now  resorted to foreign trade blockades  and military 
threats to maintain the old Viceroyalty of the River Plate united under its 
political leadership.43  The  federalist project's collapse is a  classic 
example  of  a  collective action failure due to the  free rider problem.  Should 
Buenos  Aires defeat loyalists in Uruguay,  Bolivia,  and Chile,  and keep  the 
Portuguese  in Brazil at bay,  Paraguay would benefit.  Therefore,  Buenos Aires, 
wished  Paraguay to contribute to the struggle.  However,  Buenos  Aires  would 
have  had to fight  anyway,  and might  win,  even if Paraguay did not contribute. 
Thus,  it was  rational  for Argentina to seek to coerce  Paraguay to cooperate in 
the struggle; it was  similarly rational for  Paraguay to seek to free ride, 
especially if it anticipated that the concessions Argentina offered in 
exchange  for help would be short lived,  as  they in fact  turned out to be.  That 
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after the defeat of  the  1811  expeditions  Buenos  Aires  did not actually attempt 
to coerce  Paraguay by direct military means  but instead chose  the  lower  cost 
option of blockading suggests that it anticipated the marginal  costs of 
subjecting Paraguay to be  lower than the marginal gains of so doing.  44 
b)The  blockades  Buenos  Aires  imposed on riverain traffic,  however, 
though never total,  appear to have  been effective enough to cause  exports  and 
imports  to fall,  the shipping and transportation industries to contract,  and 
tax revenues  from  foreign trade to decline.  Moreover,  averting the threat of 
forceful  "federation"  required the  Paraguayan government  to increase its 
military strength just as  the blockades  worsened the public  finance picture. 
The  government  attempted to offset the budgetary pressure by progressively 
more  drastic measures  that went  from  raising the rate of  income  taxation to 
taxing wealth itself.  The  recessionary effects of these measures  appeared in 
short order.  Furthermore,  as  the Army grew,  the balance of power shifted away 
from  supporters of  federation and  freer trade and  towards  Francia,  who  had 
supported those aims  initially but would  turn against  them later.  Political 
power  became progressively more  concentrated in his hands,  and he  eventually 
became  "perpetualII  Dictator. 
This  view is supported by the  foreign trade and budgetary record of this 
decade,  as  well  as  by its political history.  The  foreign trade record clearly 
points  towards  a  pronounced export decline.  Paraguay's yearly export earnings 
averaged almost  400,000  pesos  fuertes  ($f)  between 1792  and 1796.  During  the 
same  period,  average yerba mate  exports  accounted for  roughly three fourths  of 
export earnings,  and approached  200,000  arrobas.  By  1807  yerba mate  exports 
reached nearly 300,000  arrobas.  Although no  data on export values  is available 
these  figures  suggest  that,  barring a  drastic decline in yerba mate prices, 
export earnings  in the middle  of the first decade  of  the nineteenth century 17 
could possibly have  increased substantially beyond their 1792  96  average. 
However,  Table  1  and  Figure  1  show that by  1816  export earnings had returned 
to their 1792  96  average,  and continued to fall later in the decade.  4s 
Table  1  goes  about  here 
Figure  1  goes  about here 
The  budgetary record suggests that military considerations drove 
government  spending and forced fiscal measures  of  a  decidedly contractionary 
nature to be  imposed.  This  contention emerges  from  an analysis of  government 
budgets  and military expenditures  compiled by White  for  some  of  the years of 
this period.  Government  revenues  and expenditures are respectively summarised 
in Tables  2  and 3,  and are graphically depicted in Figures  2  and 3.46  Tables 
4  and  5,  and  Figure  4,  do  the  same  for military expenditures.  These  figures 
paint a  fairly clear picture of the unfolding process,  despite the lack of 
several years'  data.  47 
Table  2  goes  about here 
Figure  2  goes  about here 18 
Table  3  goes about  here 
Figure  3  goes  about here 
Following his designation as Dictator,  Francia further built up  that 
portion of  the Army  and the Navy under his effective control.  48  Table  3  shows 
that between  1816  and  1820,  military expenditures  rose by about  one  third 
(31.6~)  and  troop strength more  than doubled.  White  asserts that after 1815 
"the government  constructed approximately 100  river craft,  including sloops, 
flatboats,  and  enormous  canoes ...  ,,49  White's government  budget  figures  reveal 
that  in 1816  and  1818,  allocations to the military,  public works,  and salaries 
of the state bureaucracy all increased.  Only Church allocations,  a  small 
component  of total expenditures,  decreased.  Tax  revenues  simultaneously fell 
as  a  proportion of total government  revenues  from  84~ to  52.5~ in the period 
in question,  consistent with the notion that foreign  trade blockades  and 
higher taxation had caused an  economic contraction.  50  The  government  ran 
substantial budget  surpluses nevertheless,  but only because  lower tax revenues 
were  more  than offset by confiscations,  whose  value almost  equaled that of the 
1818  budget surplus.  51  The  budget  surplus of  1818  reflected increased fines 
and confiscations applied to the private sector and  the  Church as  well  as  the 
more  stringent enforcement of the  "droit d'aubaine,"  by which the assets of 
deceased  foreigners  without  known heirs in the country became  state property. 
After 1818,  such government  exactions  appear to increase whenever  there is a 19 
budget deficit. 
Expenditures  on the military and public works  continued to increase in 
1820,  and although there were  some  reductions  in outlays for government 
salaries and  church emoluments,  total spending by the government  continued to 
rise as  well.  However,  export and excise tax revenues  fell again in 1820. 
Revenues  from export  taxes contracted particularly precipitously.52 This fall 
was  offset by increased sales of state products to the troops  and the public, 
which rose  throughout  these years,  but  in particularly noticeable  fashion  in 
1820.  In that year,  most state sales to the public were  accounted for  by sales 
of agricultural products and cattle.  53  Confiscations,  fines,  state 
inheritances and rents of state property together did not amount  to  5%  of the 
budget.  54  The  first overt budget deficit consequently appeared,  equal  to 
approximately 1/4 of total government  expenditures. 
Table  4  goes  about here 
Figure  4  goes  about  here 
Table  5  goes  about here 
The political history of the decade is also consistent with that view. 
Presumably because they found  themselves ill equipped to conduct negotiations 
with the portefios,  the military officers in the government  invited Francia  ­
who  had resigned- to rejoin the government.  Francia agreed in November  1812, 
on condition that an additional battalion be  equipped and put directly under 20 
his  command.  Once  he  controlled a  military force  capable of offsetting that of 
the filiado officers,  he progressively consolidated his political position. 
successively he  edged out the representatives of the  Church,  of the mercantile 
elite and,  finally,  when  the  Congress  of 1814  named  him Dictator for  a  five 
year period,  the military itself.  A  much  smaller Congress  designated him 
Dictator for life and  "ser sin exemplar"  in 1816.  Both Congresses are said to 
have  been dominated by lesser country folk,  who  presumably made  up  the bulk of 
Francia's supporters.  No  other congress  was  convened for  the remainder of  the 
decade,  or of his rule,  for that matter.  55 
As  the Army's  size increased and its composition changed,  its general 
political attitudes altered.  In early 1814  a  significant portion of  the Army 
outside Asunci6n still supported Federalism,  as evidenced by the fact that the 
military commander  of Paraguay's  southernmost garrison,  disobeying the 
Consuls'  warnings  not  to intervene in regional  squabbles,  joined Artigas,  the 
leader of federalist forces  in the  Banda Oriental.  However,  most  federalists 
among  the Army's  filiado officers -despite the worsening  economic  situation­
abided by the Consuls'  commands.  Furthermore,  they did not rebel against 
Francia when  he  became  temporary or  "perpetual" Dictator and appear to have 
reacted only after Francia decided,  in 1819,  to dissolve the filiado corps, 
merging the officers and the soldiers loyal to him into the urbano structure 
he  commanded,  and purging the rest.  Apparently,  only when  their prerogatives 
and salaries were  threatened did the federalist filiado officers decide  to 
accept the long standing invitation of Uruguayan Federalists to  join forces 
and overthrow Francia's government,  but by then it was  too late.  The  resulting 
military conspiracy was  discovered and severely repressed,  and the Army  then 
fell under Francia's complete control.  56 
The  reticence of  Paraguayan federalist officers to  join Artigas  may 
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partly be  accounted  for  by the  fact  that these military leaders were 
themselves cattle ranchers or came  from cattle ranching families.  Artigas' 
army wrought  havoc  on cattle herds  and estancias.  Therefore,  the prospect 
allying themselves  with Artigas,  could not be  reassuring to Paraguayan 
military officers.  57  Furthermore,  Buenos Aires  had threatened to invade 
Paraguay if it joined with federalist  forces  in the Banda Oriental and  the 
Littoral.  The  fact that Paraguayan army federalists  on  the whole  rejected 
overtures  from their counterparts in Uruguay and Argentina's Littoral to  join 
their struggle against Buenos Aires  indicates that they regarded the latter's 
threat to invade  Paraguay in such an eventuality as  sufficiently credible to 
warrant  adhering to  a  neutral position.  The  small peasantry,  similarly,  could 
also lose much  more  from participation in interprovincial struggles than  from 
blockades and economic  recession and must  have  been pleased by Francia's 
commitment  not to meddle  in provincial wars,  to which he steadfastly adhered 
during this decade.  The  fact that he  did not adhere  to that commitment  in the 
next  two  decades  raises the question of opportunism. 
In conclusion,  then,  participating in military struggles outside the 
province necessarily implied paying the  taxes  in men  and goods.  Refusing to 
participate on Buenos Aires'  side risked a  foreign trade blockadej  an alliance 
with the federalists risked an invasion  from  Buenos Aires  and might  involve  a 
social upheaval  as well.  The  government  apparently chose  the lesser evil,  that 
is, it withstood  a  foreign  trade blockade,  even if that meant  the  temporary 
loss of markets  downstream and  economic  recession,  as well as  the eventual 
threat of  invasion of the federalists themselves.  That there initially was 
majority support  for this course of action among  landowners,  peasants,  and the 
Army  is clear.  It is also clear that as costs  rose  support  shrunk,  especially 
among  larger landowners  and cattle ranchers  and the sector of the army 22 
associated with them. 
The  federalist solution having failed,  militarisation progressively 
increased and,  as it did,  so did the degree of monopoly  the government 
exercised over political power.  The  ruler's military strength eventually grew 
to the point that he  could absorb that portion of the Army still under the 
control of interior caudillos.  Their belated attempt to  form  a  coalition with 
the Uruguayan  and Argentine Federalists was  discovered and  thoroughly 
repressed.  The  government  confiscated their assets,  thus attaining a  degree of 
economic  autonomy  from taxation as well as  a  direct economic  role that it did 
not posses before.  The  government's  autonomy  from  those  who  had originally 
brought it to power  grew as well.  Up  to now,  however,  economic  recession and 
political repression had narrowed  income differences between sectors of  the 
population,  but the country's property rights distribution had not drastically 
changed.  It would  during the next  decade. 
Section 3. 	 Fiscal Crisis,  International  Trade,  Land Confiscations,  and 
Labour  Coercion in the  1820's. 
I  will argue  in this section that,  early in the decade of  the 1820s,  the 
economic  depression and fiscal crisis deepened.  Fortuitously,  however,  an 
increase  in international trade that turned out to be temporary gave  the 
government  a  chance  to increase its revenues by expropriating lands, 
establishing state ranches  worked with Army  and other coerced labour,  Indian 
as well as  black,  and selling the goods  expropriated or produced in state 
enterprises in the domestic as well  as  the foreign market.  58  Throughout this 
decade  the government  increasingly resorted to measures  of  the  type the late 
colonial administration had  implemented and,  in some  cases,  abandoned later 
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on,  measures  that those areas of the world caught  in the transformations of 
the modern  period had been discarding since the mid  seventeenth century.  Thus, 
Paraguay's early national government  appears  to have  failed to innovate vis  a 
vis the colonial institutional structure and progressive institutional 
tendencies elsewhere,  as well as  to have actually exacerbated  some  colonial 
institutional features,  so that  a  veritable institutional regression may be 
said to have  taken place.  This,  I  contend,  is properly referred to as 
neocolonialism. 
Let us first take up  the question of public finances.  Discussion of this 
issue is possible for  the early and late twenties but not for the  intervening 
four year period stretching from  1823  to 1828,  for which data are not 
available;  for  the purposes of this section,  however,  a  discussion of  the 
early twenties will suffice.  The data on the late twenties will be  discussed 
in the next section in connection with the decade of the 1830's. 
On  the expenditure side,  expenses of the military and public works, 
government  salaries,  and Church emoluments  dropped in absolute  terms  between 
1820  and  1822.  on  the  income  side,  however,  sales of state products  to troops 
declined by  50%  to almost  one  fourth of their 1820  value,  and rents  from state 
property were negligible.  The fall in tax revenues  was  so drastic that only 
sizeable confiscations,  35-40%  larger in nominal  terms  than those of  1818, 
allowed the government budget  for  1822  to  show  a  surplus,  albeit a  small 
one.  59  Although spending decreased still further in 1823,  and tax revenues 
increased,  there was  another overt budget deficit amounting  to  30%  of total 
expenditures,  possibly because  there were  no  confiscations that year.  60 
Clearly,  the  government  faced  a  bleak revenue picture in the early 1820s' . 
Consider  now  the issue of increased trade opportunities with 
neighbouring states and then the related one of land confiscations.  Trade 
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options  improved because both Brazil and Argentina sought better commercial 
relations with Paraguay,  prompted by their brewing dispute over the Banda 
Oriental which eventually would lead them  to the Cisplatine War  of the late 
1820's.61 To  Brazil's overtures,  Francia  responded that  "on our part,  there 
is no objection to trading with the  Portuguese,  in the  same  way that other 
peoples of America  who  have constituted themselves  into independent states 
have  done. 1162  To  Buenos Aires'  overtures,  however,  Francia chose not  to 
respond at all,  although transportation costs by water were  lower  than 
overland.  63 
Trade  between  Paraguay and Brazil would take place overland between  two 
former  Jesuit missions,  ytapua,  on the Parana River's right bank,  and  Sao 
Borja,  on the Uruguay's left bank.  Brazilian merchants  carried Paraguayan 
products  across Misiones  to Sao Borja and  from  there to  "Porto Alegre,  which 
served as  the distribution point for Montevideo,  Buenos Aires,  and Rio  de 
Janeiro,"  that is,  ports which normally could have  been reached more  easily by 
river from  Asuncion,  as  well  as  down  the Uruguay river.  54  Francia would later 
remark  that  lI(i)t now  seems  obvious  that Buenos  Aires .. is scheming to ..  impede 
and cut  the Brazilian commerce  with Paraguay,  which has hurt  them as  much as 
they envy it.  1I65  Apparently,  Francia chose  the higher cost,  overland trade 
option with Brazil and rejected repeated Argentine offers to trade at lower 
cost via the Parana River in order to hurt Argentina by not letting it share 
in the gains  from  that trade.  56  It apparently concerned him little that his 
decision benefited Brazilian merchants at the expense of  Paraguayan producers 
and merchants,  and  that the  damage  to Argentina would be  slight,  if any.67 
Francia's decision to give preferential treatment to Brazil was  all the more 
unfortunate because official Brazilian interest in trading with Paraguay 
cooled once  the Cisplatine War  ended.  Similarly,  Argentine attitudes also 25 
changed  for the worse:  in December of 1829  the last of the relatively free 
trade oriented Argentine governments  was  deposed by Rosas  who,  "backed by his 
estanciero allies and his rural hordes,"  retook power  and  resumed attempts  to 
force  Paraguay to join the United Provinces  by  commercial  pressure.  68 
While  the trade with Brazil lasted,  however,  Francia made  determined 
efforts to encourage it. Most  important among  these  was  securing the trade 
routes over which  the trade was  carried.  To  that effect,  as early as  1822  he 
ordered his military to occupy Candelaria,  across  the Parana in territory 
contested by Corrientes,  which unleashed the so-called "undeclared war  between 
Paraguay and  Corrientes.,,69  In so doing,  Francia broke with the policy of 
neutrality in regional military squabbles  he  had promised to follow  in the 
early 1810's,  by which  he  had  improved his political fortune at the  expense of 
federative efforts;  his decision clearly shows  that he  was  capable of breaking 
a  political promise for  commercial gain if he  no  longer required the political 
support  that promise  had earned him.  Now  that he  had an army  completely loyal 
to thim,  that he  had repressed the conspiracy of  1820,  and  that he  had 
confiscated ranches  from his political enemies  he  could clearly afford to 
disappoint  some  of his former peasant supporters if in the process he  might 
obtain sorely needed revenues.  This  suggests opportunism. 
While  Francia was  willing to make  a  determined effort to keep  trade 
routes with Brazil open in the southeast,  he  was  not  interested in something 
similar in the North,  despite the fact that it offered an additional,  lower 
cost substitute for decreased trade with Argentina.  He  thus  closed the 
northern frontier with Brazil and rejected Grandsire's  request to be  allowed 
into Paraguay to search for  the  connection between the  Paraguay and the Amazon 
rivers.  7o  International trade was  thus restricted to ytapua and pilar del 
Neembucu  on  the  Paraguay river;  no  international trade was  allowed to take 
/ 26 

place through Asunci6n or Concepci6n.  Though trade  through ytapua was  by far 
more  important  than through Pilar,  it was  rather small  by comparison to  the 
late colonial trade through Asunci6n.  The  colonial policy of  "puertos 
precisos,"  therefore,  was  reinstituted. 
Trade  through these ports,  furthermore,  could only take place on  a 
barter basis.  In forbidding that money  should leave the country except  for  the 
purchase  of arms,  Francia had observed in the middle  of the previous  decade 
that  lithe extraction of precious metal  is not  necessary to maintain foreign 
trade,  assuming that a  country's export always  exceed its imports. II  In the 
middle of  the  following  decade,  he  reiterated that prohibition,  and also 
ordered that import  duties be paid in kind.  71  The  measure prohibiting 
precious metals  from leaving the country may  have been prompted by  a  scarcity 
of money,  possibly due  to a  balance of  trade deficit or to hoarding.  That 
there may  have been  a  balance of  trade deficit is suggested by the fact  that 
individuals attempted to smuggle  money  out of  the country.  That  there may  have 
been hoarding as  well  is consistent with the fact that the number  of 
silversmithing establishments in the country apparently grew.  Francia may  have 
sought  to curtail hoarding in restricting the growth of these establishments 
in 1829.  72 
Until trade with Brazil  improved in the early 1820s,  then,  Paraguay's 
economy  had been in a  pronounced downturn and state revenues  had been rapidly 
declining.  Even  though it turned out to be  temporary,  this  improvement  was  a 
sorely needed stimulus for the economy and government budgets,  both of  which 
may  be  said to have  been gasping for air.  Therefore,  it would be more 
appropriate to characterise this decade's  trade with Brazil as  the device that 
kept  the  economy and government budget afloat rather than as  an  "escape 
valve,"  as proposed by White.  For White's alternative characterisation to be 
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correct Paraguay's  economy had to be  overheating,  that is,  growing  rapidly 
under  the sole  impulse of a  strong domestic  demand,  and  the trade must  have 
somehow  served to decrease  demand.  Clearly,  domestic  demand  was  not strong in 
the early twenties;  furthermore,  the  trade with Brazil,  if anything,  raised 
demand. 73 
Let  us  now consider the state's land expropriations and the subsequent 
establishment of state ranches.  The early national state,  from its inception, 
owned substantial amounts  of lands.  It had inherited them  from  the colonial 
administration upon  independence and had changed only their name;  they ceased 
to be royal  lands and instead became public  lands.  SubsequentlyI  land 
confiscations substantially increased the acreage under state control.  Though 
a  few  confiscations  took place in the  1810 / s,  the bulk of the confiscations in 
the period under  study occurred in the  1820 / s.  Four waves  of expropriations 
were  observed in that decade.  The  first came  about  immediately after the 
repression of  the  "Great  Conspiracy"  of the  1820's and affected lands  owned by 
those  summarily convicted of having participated in the  conspiracy;  the  second 
wave  aimed at the  lands of  religious organisations I  expropriated in 1823  and 
1824;  the third l  at the  lands of private proprietors or squatters without 
clear title which the state confiscated after 1825;  and the fourth,  in 1828, 
may  have affected recipients of colonial land grants  who  had not fulfilled the 
conditions to which they had obliged themselves upon  receipt of the grant, 
more  specifically,  the requirement of settling the  lands  they had been 
granted.  It is clear that the great bulk of the expropriations  came  after the 
"Great  Conspiracy"  and before Rosas/s  rise to power in Argentina.  The  second, 
third and fourth waves  of confiscations,  to which a  substantial part of the 
total acreage confiscated may be attributed,  came after Francia accepted 
Brazilian overtures to  improve  commercial  relations.  Some  of  the confiscated 
l 
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lands  were  transformed into state ranches,  others were  rented.  I  will  now 
examine  the transformation of expropriated lands  into state ranches  in greater 
detail.  I  will also make  reference to the question of rents of state lands, 
but will reserve  a  fuller discussion of this issue for  the next section. 
In the 1810's the state expropriated relatively minor  amounts  of  land, 
from state debtors and  from  those who  had not fulfilled the requirements of 
their land grants.  Those  lands were  consolidated with those of a  former  royal 
ranch  the government  sought  to restock in order to facilitate the provisioning 
of troops that would  man military defense lines against  Indian attacks  in the 
south.  74  Land belonging to foreigners  who  had died without heirs also accrued 
to the state as  a  result of the application of the  "droit d'aubaine." 
The  rate of confiscations increased rapidly following the discovery of 
the  "Great  Conspiracy"  and its repression in 1820.  Francia approved  "autos"  to 
permit the state to confiscate all the property of the convicted.  An  idea of 
the  amount  of  land,  livestock,  and slaves  involved can be gleaned from  the 
case of  Manuel  Cavafias,  who  died in prison over  12  years after his conviction. 
The  state confiscated two  estancias,  twenty three slaves,  3727  head of cattle, 
502  studs,  1,178 mares  and  21  mules  he  owned  in one locality alone 
(Tebicuary).  Cavafias  is said to have  owned  more properties than this evidence 
would  suggest,  and these may  have  been confiscated as well.  "The  Yegros  and 
Montiel  families  (four of the  former  and eight of the latter were  shot  in 
1821)  forfeited a  far larger patrimony to the state."  From the fact  that the 
executed army officers were  themselves  landowners  or belonged to the  landowner 
class it has  been inferred that  "the property gained by the state was 
enormous,"  though no mention is made  of the total acreage expropriated.  75 
Next  came  the  Church lands.  The  Colegio Seminario  de  San Carlos  was 
ordered closed on  23  March  1823,  and all the furniture and effects in its 
/ 29 
urban locale were  transferred to the  "Administraci6n de  propiedades,"  a  state 
agency charged with administering state property that also took over the 
Colegio's  farm at Nu  Guazu and its other lands.  These  included holdings  in 
fourteen different locations  in the  country.76  In addition,  Francia decreed 
the so-called  "Reforma de  Regulares"  on  20  September  1824,  ordering that all 
monasteries  be  dissolved and their clergy secularised.  The  sworn  inventories 
that each monastery was  required to present to the government  have yet to be 
thoroughly examined.  Thus,  the overall quantum and value of  church assets 
expropriated by the state is unclear.  It appears,  however,  that  "at least one 
conventual  house had managed to retain considerable wealth to the day of its 
dissolution.  This monastery admitted its several buildings in Asuncion, 
sizeable amounts  of land in various places,  herds of livestock,  and  43  slaves. 
In addition,  it received rents  from more  than  90  families  renting monastery 
land."  The  five orders'  main buildings,  four  in Asunci6n and  one  in Villa 
Rica,  were  turned into barracks,  and their wealth was  transferred to the 
government  treasury.  77 
Furthermore,  Francia decreed in September of  1825  that within three 
months  individuals should present the titles to the  lands  they occupied or 
they would  be declared property of the state.  " .. in February of 1826,  more 
than half of the  lands ...of the Eastern Region  and the whole of the Chaco 
territory"  were declared state property.78  Finally,  in 1828  Francia notified 
recipients of unsettled royal  land grants that they had  two  months  to fulfill 
the  conditions of  the grant,  i.e.,  to effectively occupy their lands,  or the 
state would expropriate them and send poor families  to the  Southern Coast  to 
settle them. 79  The  expropriated ranches  were  rechristened as  "ranches  of the 
fatherland."  The process  resembled the colonial  "denuncia  y  composici6n," 
except that ranches  whose titles were not  in order became  state property. 30 
There  may  have  been state ranches before  the confiscations but  they are 
likely to have  been  few.  There is evidence  suggesting that the early national 
state owned  two  ranches.  For example,  we  know that as early as  lS13  the 
consular government  sought to establish a  settlement  (Tevego)  in the northern 
frontier  (the so-called  "Northern Coast")  and to restock an existing state 
ranch there and in the southern frontier  (the so-called "Southern Coast") . 
This  measure  sought to further  support the defense effort against  Indian 
attacks,  which  had made it necessary to establish additional  forts  in both the 
Northern and the Southern Coasts  in the lS10's.  Thus,  in lS14,  the consular 
government,  then headed by Francia,  restocked the existing state ranch at 
Concepcion,  for which it bought  1700  head of cattle and 150  mares.  Francia 
also  "reestablished a  cattle ranch"  in the  south,  and widened it in lS16  with 
lands of  two  types,  those expropriated from state debtors and those unsettled 
by its grantees.  Squatters were evicted to consolidate the lands with those of 
the state ranch.  Secondary sources  show no  additional hard evidence that more 
ranches  may  have  been  formed until after the Great Rebellion of  lS20.  80 
The  assertion that state ranches  may  have  been  few  before the lS20's 
runs  counter to earlier estimates.  Williams puts the number of royal  ranches 
inherited by the early national state at forty.81  This  figure  is based on  a 
list which its proponent claims is from  lSlS.  Francia did comission an 
inventory of state ranches  that year.  82  Authors  like Galeano Romero  and 
White,  however,  have  suggested that Williams'  list is not  from  lS18,  White 
claiming that "it is more  recent than 1827. ,,83  State ranches  may  have  been 
numerous  in the  lS10s'  had the ranches of the expelled Jesuits fallen under 
direct state administration after the order's expulsion.  However,  many  former 
Jesuit ranches  appear to have  been turned over to the Colegio Seminario de  San 
Carlos,  according to Riquelme Garcia and to Rivarola Paoli,  as  well  as to 31 
private individuals,  according to Rengger  and Longchamps.a4  Thus,  the number 
of state ranches  administered by the state itself is likely to have  been  low 
until after the expropriation following  the  "Great Conspiracy"  and  the 
dissolution of the religious orders,  that is,  until the 1820s. 
The  state used the produce of the ranches it confiscated mainly to feed 
and equip the  troops  and other state employees.  The  remainder  -agricultural 
produce,  livestock,  and merchandise- was  sold in the domestic market  as well 
as  to Brazilian traders.  State budget  figures put together by White  suggest 
that sales of state products to the public  (SSPP)  were negligible in 1816  and 
1818,  but  they rose  in 1820,  the year of the Great  Rebellion,  fell again in 
1822  and  1823,  and  increased once  more after Church and other lands were 
expropriated.  In  1823,  the year before the Reforma  de  Regulares,  SSPP  were  one 
fourth of what  they were  in 1828,  the year when the last wave  of 
expropriations was  carried out.  as 
The  state also rented the  lands it expropriated.  Revenues  collected on 
this account are given in Table  6,  according to which rents of state lands 
drastically declined between  1816  and  1818,  both absolutely and as  a  share of 
total revenues,  were negligible  from  1822  until the mid twenties,  but rose 
substantially in 1828  and  1829,  the next  two  years  for  which there is data. 
The  fact  that rents of state property decreased in the late 1810s  and became 
negligible in the first half of the 1820s,  together with the fact  that sales 
of state products to the public were negligible during the 1810s,  further 
support  the  contention that state ranches  may  have  been fairly few prior to 
the confiscations of the 1820s.  That  revenues  from state land rentals  should 
have  suddenly increased in the late twenties must  evidently be attributed to 
the confiscations.  Part of the increase may be due  to the fact that tenants 
who  rented land owned privately or by the Church before the confiscations 
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began paying rent to the state immediately thereafter. 
State rental  revenues  included those  the state received for renting the 
common  lands of  towns.  Rentals of  town's  common  lands  and the collection of 
the resulting revenues  had customarily been the prerogative of  town  councils 
but the central government apparently assumed those  functions  sometime  in the 
mid twenties.  86  White  reports that for the  10 year period 1827-36,  the 
government  collected a  yearly average of  350  pesos  on this account,  but does 
not  specify the number  of  "homesteads"  in the ejidos in question. 
Table  6  Goes  About  Here 
Figure  6  goes  about  here 
Analogously,  the government  redirected the produce of  the tithe as well. 
The  national state took over the Patronato Real  following  the  collapse of 
Spanish rule,  and continued to raise the tithe for  the Church in exchange  for 
the so-called  "two ninths."  Following  the  Reforma  de  Regulares,  however, 
Francia apparently devoted at least some  tithe revenues to his army.  Williams 
(1973b)  reports that  "(a)s early as  1823,  the diezmos  from  the  Concepcion area 
were  allocated for the support of the northern Chaco presidios which protected 
northern Paraguay against  Indians. ,,87 
Political factors clearly influenced Francia's  land confiscations 
immediately after the Great  Conspiracy as well as other confiscations later in 
the decade.  However,  the contention that the confiscations  following  the Great 
Conspiracy were  mainly politically motivated relies on  the assumption that 
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there was  such a  conspiracy.  However,  evidence supporting the contention that 
the alleged conspiracy did in fact take place is,  at best,  rather thin.  The 
"conspiracy"  was  presumably discovered as  a  result of  a  confession passed on 
by a  priest to the authorities.  Summary trials were held subsequently,  but 
evidence in favor or against the charges  was  subsequently destroyed by the 
government.  Velazquez  asks:  "Was  there  a  conspiracy in 1820?"  and  answers  that 
"(t)here mayor may  not have  been one ...There is a  wide  bibliography on  the 
subject, ..  but  we  do not  find in it objective testimonies allowing us  to 
arrive at the definitive certainty  (that there was  such a  conspiracy) ."a8 
Much  more  compelling is the evidence presented above,  which suggests  an 
alternative contention,  i.e.,  that public finance  considerations played a 
major  role in unleashing all the waves  of land confiscations of the decade  of 
the twenties.  Thus,  it is reasonable to suggest that the confiscations may 
have  been prompted more  by economic  than by political rationales. 
The alterations in the distribution of  landed property rights described 
above  has  been labeled an  "original," state-led "agrarian reform. ,,89  The 
claim to originality seems  to be misplaced,  however.  It has  long been claimed 
that Francia's  land rentals were  simply the early national version of  the 
colonial  emphyteusis,  which was  itself adapted  from  the older European 
emphyteusis.  9o  This  is consistent with the  fact  that the colonial legal 
system in general  remained in force  -unaltered,  for the most part- in 
Paraguay's early national period.  91  Furthermore,  Francia's  emphytheusis  ­
curiously enough- follows  attempts by the governments  of Rodriguez  and 
Rivadavia in the eighteen twenties  to institute the emphyteusis  system in 
Argentina.  92  Coincidentally,  rents of state property in Paraguay,  which were 
mostly made  up of state land rentals,  did not begin to rise as  a  proportion of 
government  revenues until the late twenties according to Table  6.  The  colonial 34 
emphytheusis  did suffer some  modifications under Francia during the early 
national period in the  sense that Francia's emphyteusis,  like Rivadavia's, 
differed from  the  European in that land did not eventually become  the  tenant's 
property.  However,  this could hardly be called original.  93  In the case of  the 
emphytheusis,  therefore,  Francia added his  own  twist to an old institution, 
making it more  stringent,  i.e., asserting the interests of the state over 
those of individuals.  The  assertion regarding the colonial character of 
Francia's land rentals,  therefore,  is largely correct,  and to the extent it is 
Francia's  land expropriations and rentals cannot be said to have been 
"original." 
Claims  of  "agarian reform"  are also hard to take seriously since 
property rights  changes  clearly differed from what  is normally understood by 
that expression,  i.e.,  land distribution in private property at or below 
market prices to landless peasants.  Furthermore,  in order to effect it the 
government  in fact  expropriated lands  from peasants,  evicted squatters  from 
lands it expropriated from non-peasants  and consolidated into state ranches, 
charged rents to the very peasants whose  lands it expropriated for  the 
privilege of remaining on their old lands,  and  charged peasants rents  for 
using the  common  lands of their own  towns  as well  as for letting them use  the 
lands of state ranches. 
Consider  now  the question of state ranch operation,  that of the  labour 
force used  on  them in particular.  The  consensus  opinion is that state ranches 
were operated by the Army  and there is evidence that state ranches  did use 
Army  recruits.  94  However,  it is also clear that state ranches  employed other 
forms  of  coerced labour.  I  have already referred to evidence  suggesting that, 
in expropriating the assets of its political opponents  and  the religious 
orders,  the state became  the  owner  of a  good  number of black slaves,  whose 35 
status remained unaltered under their new  master.  Moreover,  after the mid 
1820s  the state apparently made  slaves of free blacks.  95  Furthermore,  there 
is evidence that the state may  also have  compelled indigenous people to render 
services  from which they had already been legally exempted earlier in the 
colonial or national period.  According  to white,  Francia moved  Indian 
communities north of the Parana river, 
"close enough to the river to be protected by Paraguayan military 
patrols  -under the direct supervision of the central government. 
Limiting the power  of the mayordomos,  he  reorganised the local  economies 
by employing  the Mission inhabitants ..  in the production of tobacco, 
yerba,  and hides,  much  of which was  traded with the Brazilians..as well 
as  in the manufacture  of cotton cloth,  shoe  soles,  and hats ..  ,,96 
The  resettled indigenous  communities to which White  refers are the  five Jesuit 
Mission  towns  of the Candelarias district that Francia forcefully moved north 
of the  Parana river in 1817.  97  In addition to relocating the  five  former 
mission towns  in the late 1810s,  the Army  transferred indigenous people  from 
the Candelarias district to the northern shore of the Parana river in several 
other instances in the early twenties.  Smaller groups of indigenous people 
were  resettled north of the  Parana river by both the military expedition that 
forced  Bompland's  large party from  Candelaria to the north shore of  the Parana 
river in 1821,  and  the large,  long-lasting expedition of 1823,  which crossed 
the Parana River  and went  as  far south as the Uruguay river,  apprehending all 
suspicious  individuals.  98 
White's  statement is consistent with Rengger  and Longchamps'  report 
that,  in 1823,  Francia 36 
n •• ordered a  detailed estimate of the possessions of  each settlement to 
be  made  out.  At  the  same  time he  contracted the power of  the managers 
and  forbad  them  to make  purchases or sales,  without his express 
permission.  Since then he  has  employed the  Indians  for the  immediate 
account of government,  either in manufacturing cotton cloths for  the 
clothing of the  troops,  or as  the labourers  and hewers  of  wood  for 
public works. ,,99 
Under  the  name  of mayordomos,  Francia appears  to have reinstituted the 
colonial office of the corregidores de  indios,  which  the  Bourbonic  intendants 
were  supposed to have  done  away with.  The  corregidores de  indios,  it will  be 
remembered,  had what  amounted to a  trade monopoly in the towns  assigned to 
them.  They could force  town dwellers to purchase clothing from  them at 
inflated prices and to sell their products only through them.  100  The 
previously quoted passage  suggests  Francia allowed mayordomos  less power  than 
corregidores had had to engage  in commercial  activities.  The  power  of  the 
mayordomos  as agents  of the central government,  on  the other hand,  may  have 
actually increased.  This is suggested by the appearance  -beginning in 1828- of 
a  new  item on the receipts side of government  budgets,  "transfers  from 
mayordomos  of pueblos"  to the central government.  101 
The nature of the work  these  indigenous people  were  supposed to furnish 
the government  may  be gleaned from  archival  evidence and  the reports of 
contemporary observers.  To  cite just one  example of archival evidence 
available in this connection,  in 1821  Francia wrote to Norberto Ortellado, 
Subdelegado de  Santiago: 
"the six Guaycuriices  work perfectly in public works  with the other 
Indians,  and all are imprisoned with chains.  They will  thus get used to 37 
living in subjection,  busy,  and working,  which is much better and  for 
them than that they should take to the trade of bandits and 
highwaymen. 102 
According to travel reports the government  designated particular crops  such as 
wheat  and cotton for cultivation in certain areas  in the south such as 
TebicuarYi  it is possible that the reference is to these resettled former 
mission towns.  103 
All this indicates that Francia consolidated Indian towns  north of  the 
Parana River,  where  the  sway of his military was  stronger,  subjected them  to 
military rule,  put  them under the direct administration of agents of  the 
central go¥ernment,  the mayordomos,  set them tasks,  and taxed  them. 
The  question now arises,  what  lands were  these  indigenous  communities 
assigned to support  themselves  and satisfy state requirements?  They must  have 
been assigned  some  lands  for  they could not otherwise have  carried out 
production of agricultural staples.  Clearly,  the state could have settled the 
indigenous population on the lands it expropriated  from  the  Colegio and the 
religious orders.  The  data itself,  therefore,  suggest  the hypothesis  that 
budgetary pressures together with increased commerce  with Brazil contributed 
to the state's land expropriations and increased reliance on  coerced labour. 
Rengger  and  Longchamps  furnish evidence  consistent with the hypothesis. 
Describing the political organisation of  "that part of  Paraguay..known  as 
Misiones"  which  "extends over  a  surface of  six hundred square leagues"  and 
"consists of eight tribes of  Indians"  they observe that  "the Indians,  attached 
to  the soil and  condemned  to work  on  state lands,  have peculiar officers,  who 
under  the  name  of administrators,  manage  the state lands besides exercising 
the  function of  commandant  over the  Indians."  They  furthermore state that 38 
"several other villages  inhabited by the  Indians in the interior of  the 
country,  which  formerly belonged to the Jesuits or other religious communities 
have  also managers  set over  them. ,,104  In addition,  numerous  communications 
between Francia and Norberto Ortellado during the early twenties attest to the 
fact  that the Army  "aggregated"  the indigenous people captured south of the 
Parana river to previously existing Indian communities north of the 
river.  10S  Finally,  Rengger  and Longchamps  state that 
" (t)here used to be,  before,  no  such thing as  a  dexterous  workman  in 
Paraguay.  But  the Dictator,  by  the number  of the public works  which he 
caused to be  undertaken,  gave  a  spring to industry:  and as  the projects 
which he  conceived were  above  the capacity of the artizans whom  he 
employed,  he  had recourse  to intimidation in order to awaken  that 
natural ability with which every native of Paraguay is endowed.  He 
caused a  gibbet to be erected,  and he  threatened a  poor  shoemaker  to 
hang  him up,  because  he  had not made  some  belts of the size he  required. 
Thus it was  that out of blacksmiths,  shoemakers,  and masons,  he  created 
a  race  of whitesmiths,  saddlers,  and architects. ,,106 
In conclusion,  the observation that slavery was  extended to previously 
free blacks,  and the contention that colonial  forms  of coerced indigenous 
labour reappeared during the Francia regime  can be  seen to have obtained 
within the  context of expanding  -rather than contracting- trade.  Future 
archival research may  yield further support for  the hypothesis. l07 
The  real  rationale for  Francia's alteration in the distribution of 
landed property rights  through expropriations,  state ranches,  and emphyteusis, 
contend,  was  that suggested by the data itself,  that is,  revenue raising.  I 39 
Clearly,  these measures  were  a  tax increase.  loa  They were  intended to 
address  budgetary crises and,  therefore,  they are best regarded as  a  public 
finance  reform rather than as  an agrarian reform.  Fiscal  expediency was  also 
the rationale for the Argentine  emphyteusis,  not any thought  of reorganizing 
the nation's public finances  around a  single land tax similar to the  "impet 
unique"  proposed by the  French Physiocrats.  The  scheme  appears  to have  had 
just as little success in Argentina,  where  "(t)ill 1827  revenues  from  this 
source barely exceeded 5,000 pesos! ,,109 
Thus,  public  finance  crises in the presence of  improved international 
trade would  seem  to have  led in opposite directions in Paraguay as contrasted 
to seventeenth century England.  Conditions  there allowed rulers to separate 
military from  tax collecting bureaucracies,  which led to the rise of standing 
armies  and  reduced rent-dissipation at various points along  the hierarchical 
structure that transmitted revenues  from  contributors to the ruler.  Budgetary 
pressures led British rulers to exchange  rule making  power  for revenues, 
partly because the sale of public lands  -itself a  revenue  raising measure- had 
been completed by  then and there was  a  comparatively small  army.110 
I  have  shown  that this unexpected behavior is clearly rooted in the fact 
that increased opportunities to trade resource  intensive goods  with Brazil 
raised the price of  inputs that would be used intensively in their production 
and,  therefore,  land prices and land rent.  However,  this mechanism was  at work 
in early modern England as  well.  Why  did the Paraguayan government  not divide 
up  the  lands  among  individuals,  allow them to produce goods  for  export with 
wage  labour,  and tax the factor  incomes  thus generated both directly and 
indirectly,  as  in England?  Why  did the  Paraguayan government at this point 
expropriate lands and set up state enterprises worked with Army  and other 
coerced labour,  African and  indigenous? Clearly,  the government  must  have  had 
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a  comparative advantage  in organizing a  military structure capable of backing 
the expropriation of lands and  running ranches.  It must  have  had  a  comparative 
disadvantage in forming  a  civilian bureaucracy made  up  of relatively better 
educated civil servants  capable of carrying out tax collecting activities. 
Labour  suitable for military purposes must  have been in greater supply than 
labour suitable for  a  civilian bureaucracy.  Given the country's colonial past, 
this is easy to understand.  The Junta Superior Gubernativa was  conscious of 
this shortcoming and put great emphasis  on fashioning an effective educational 
policy.  By  contrast,  Francia's very policies exacerbated the  shortage by 
reducing both the existing stock of educated personnel as well  as  the rate of 
addition to it. 
Among  measures  that reduced the stock of educated personnel  were  the 
prohibition that Spaniards occupy government positions,  the exiling of Spanish 
Americans  from other former provinces  who  had  cooperated in the  movement  for 
independence  (Somellera,  de  la Cerda),  and the exclusion of  the relatively 
better educated creole elite from the government,  through intimidation, 
imprisonment,  exile  (whether decreed or self imposed)  or execution. 
Most  important among  policies that reduced the rate of addition to the 
stock of educated personnel were  the closure of  the Colegio Seminario de  San 
Carlos and the dissolution of the religious orders.
lll Cooney's  analysis of 
educational policies between  1810  and  1850  concludes that  "in his drive  for 
power  (Francia)  brought  havoc  upon  the educational system of  the new 
republic. ,,112  Also of  consequence  in connection with reducing the  flow of 
educated personnel  was  Francia's prohibition that spaniards marry among 
themselves,  which hindered the  formation of  families and,  one  would  therefore 
presume,  the  intergenerational transfer of knowledge.  Francia's marriage 
prohibitions aimed at extending  the fiscal  implications of the colonial droit 41 
d'aubaine.  The  Junta Superior Gubernativa asserted the droit d'aubaine's 
continued validity while  simultaneously declaring  jurisdiction over the assets 
of provincials  who  died in similar circumstances.  113  Francia,  however, 
appears  to have  sought  to increase the number  of  foreigners  subject to the 
droit d'aubaine,  for  on March  1,  1814  he  forbade  "any marriage of  a  European 
male  to an American  woman  known  to be Spanish by the people,  from  the first to 
the last of the classes of the state,  no matter how  infima y  baja,"  even  in 
the case of alleged rape.  He  established severe penalties for priests  who 
might perform  such marriages as well  as  for grooms  who  should marry openly or 
clandestinely.  He  also forbid Europeans  to act as witnesses  in baptisms or 
confirmations of children of the  same  class,  or in weddings.  Europeans  could, 
however,  "wed  Indian women  of the  Indian towns,  known mulatto  women,  and black 
women,"  Viola  remarks:  "As  it may be  imagined,  many  Spaniards preferred to 
remain single rather than lower  themselves socially by mixing with the  lowest 
social classes."  Potthast-Jutkeit suggests  that this law applied at first only 
to Europeans  recently arrived in Paraguay,  but  was  later extended  "to all 
Europeans,  no matter how  long they had lived in America,  and even to people 
from other Latin American countries."  114  That  the ban's significance was 
predominantly fiscal  is evidenced by the fact that individuals could be 
exempted  from  the ban by purchasing a  license for  a  large payment  to the 
Treasury.115  This attitude contrasts with that of the Junta Superior 
Gubernativa,  which asked the Church to simplify marriage  requirements  in order 
to increase  the number  of marriages  as  a  means  to the  "true opulence  and 
prosperity of Republics"  and  "to  improve  customs".116  Thus,  a  similar 
argument  may  be  made  for Francia's droit d'aubaine as  for his emphytheusis, 
i.e.,  that it was  clearly of colonial inspiration but that it went  beyond its 
colonial antecedent  for  reasons of fiscal expediency. 
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Thus,  the government's  own  policies forced it to proceed in the 
direction in which it progressively moved.  Owing  to the lack of educated, 
trustworthy personnel onto whom  tasks  could be delegated,  much of the 
government's petty decision making and bureaucratic work  ended up  having to be 
carried out by Francia himself.  This has been  seen as  evidence  that he  was  a 
workaholic.  However,  he himself bitterly resented the  imposition but 
attributed it not to his  own  policies,  but to the fact that he  found  himself 
"in a  country of nothing but idiots,  where  the Government  has  no  one  to 
turn its eyes  to,  it being necessary that  I  should do ..  everything in 
order to remove  Paraguay from  the unhappiness .. in which it has  been 
..  for  three centuries.  ,,117 
The  statement goes  on to reveal Francia's view of himself as  the country's 
only possible savior,  as well  as  the nature and volume  of the  tasks he  had to 
perform. llS 
The  national government's agricultural policy was  clearly designed in 
response  to public finance  imperatives  and the constraints of  foreign trade 
and  labour supply conditions.  In this regard it resembled that of the late 
colonial administration,  whose  intervention in production and foreign  trade 
was  also closely associated with its intervention in and  regulation of the 
labour and land markets.  However,  though the motivation and methods  were 
similar,  the national state resorted to land expropriations and labour 
coercion to a  much greater degree  than  the late colonial administration.  119 
Furthermore,  the spread of state property in land discouraged the development 
of  a  financial  sector beyond the levels reached in the late colonial period. 
The  development  of private property in land facilitates  the  use of land as 
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collateral for bank  loans  and  thus  encourages  the development of  a  financial 
sector.  The  development  of state property in land at the expense  of private 
property,  skews  the distribution of  land assets towards  the state.  Private 
lenders are likely to be  fewer,  if only because  they will only be able to 
grant loans  that can be  secured by this years'  harvest as  opposed to the 
land.  120  Thus,  if the state holds most  rights to the country's surface  land 
and  subsoil,  it will be  the only agent in a  position to become  a  major  lender. 
By  contrast,  the early sale of crown  lands  in England was  one of  the main 
forces  leading to the rise of  a  British market  in government  securities in the 
seventeenth century,  North and Weingast  contend.  Private securities were  also 
traded in this market  later on,  and  a  full  fledged capital market  developed. 
Changes  in the property rights distribution brought about political 
changes  as well.  In this connection,  the confiscations of the early twenties, 
affecting Francia's political opponents and  the  Church,  seem to have had more 
of an effect than those of the late twenties.  Arguing  that the Asuncion 
cabildo was  not  "of popular sanction,  but only an arbitrary institution of  the 
already extinguished Spanish regime,  which neither has  nor exercises 
legitimate public representation,  having lived on  in this city..without  need, 
as experience has  demonstrated,"  Francia suppresed the cabildo of Asuncion  on 
30  December  1824,  and replaced its officers by appointed administrative 
functionaries.  121  Francia also closed the cabildo in Villarrica,  the  second 
largest town  in the  country.  White  has  argued that while the Asuncion and 
Villarrica cabildos were  suppressed,  those of interior towns  were  not. 
However,  besides those of Asuncion and Villa Rica,  there had been at most 
three other cabildos in Paraguay in towns  that during the colonial period were 
known  as  "pueblos  de  espafioles, "  those of Curuguaty and Pilar the Neembucu, 
founded early and late in the eighteenth century,  respectively,  and  that of 44 
Concepcion,  founded by the Junta Superior Gubernativa,  in 1812.  In discussing 
II interior towns,  however,  Rengger  and  Longchamps  state that  (t)hese villas, 
since the suppression of their cabildos,  which were  charged with the local 
administration of  justice,  enjoy no  longer any exclusive privilege.  Each 
section is under  the authority of  a  commandant,  who  executes  the orders of the 
Dictator,  directs the operations of  the police,  decides  on minor offenses,  and 
exercises the  functions  of conciliator."  It would appear,  then,  that contrary 
to White's assertion,  all cabildos of  former  Spanish  towns  were  suppresed. 
That  cabildos of  towns  in the interior were also dissolved and that their 
functions  were  absorbed by the central government is consistent with the 
already noted fact that the central government  took over the cabildo function 
of renting out ejido lands  and collecting the resulting revenues.  Indian towns 
also had cabildos of their own,  but  the fact that Francia appointed mayordomos 
to oversee  them  suggests that,  if they were not suppressed,  they were  not very 
effective.  Furthermore,  Rengger  and Longchamps  state that  "there formerly 
existed a  tribunal of  commerce,  which was  suppressed in 1824."  Finally,  in 
1828  Francia suppressed the Cabildo Eclesiastico.  122 
In addition,  the extension of state landownership  increases the sources 
of  revenue available  from  which the government  can draw without prior 
parliamentary consent.  It also encourages governments pressed by budget 
deficits to obtain revenues  through arbitrary exactions rather than with the 
consent of the contributors'  representatives. 
The  preceding evidence suggests that the state was  comparatively 
autonomous.  This  evidence is not consistent with the notion that the state was 
the  instrument of the  small peasantry,  as  contended by White.  The state was 
relatively more  responsive  to the small peasantry during the 1810s but not in 
the following  two  decades.  123  Furthermore,  the state clearly was  not  the 
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instrument of  the  landlords,  as  contended by Abente,  for it pursued policies 
inimical  to their interests,  repressed them politically,  and eventually 
expropriated the assets of  some  of the most  prominent  among  them.124  On  the 
contrary,  there is evidence suggesting that the state may  have  made it 
possible for military officers to become  landlords.  Thus,  one of Francia's 
military subdelegates asked for permission to establish a  private cattle ranch 
in 1821.  Francia granted the  request  and suggested that the  subdelegate also 
set up  "a good  farm,  for that is not  forbidden,  assuming  that there  there are 
lands  in excess  and that you will do  so at your  own  expense" .125 
Section  4.  Foreign  Trade  and  Public  Finances  in the  1830's. 
For  a  while  in the 1830s'  export values  rose above  the levels of the 
1820s'.  However,  they never  reached half their 1816  level and declined again 
after 1837.  Itapua exports of yerba,  tobacco,  livestock,  and hides,  show  a 
similar pattern.  Both yerba and tobacco  exports rose but  then declined,  yerba 
peaking earlier than  tobacco.  Livestock exports disappeared after 1832,  while 
exports of hides,  which were  minor  in the late 1820s'  and early 1830s' , 
increased substantially in the mid  1830s'  but declined late in that 
decade. 126  The  composition of exports reflected the state's increased 
economic  role.  white's figures  for yerba and tobacco exports distinguish 
between private and state exports.  In general private exports exceeded state 
exports,  although government yerba exports  exceeded private ones  in 1837. 
The  structure of the  revenue side of public finances  was  -by the late 
twenties  clearly different  from  what it had been in the late colonial and 
very early national periods,  except for  the fact that confiscations,  fines, 
and  forced contributions continued to be used as revenue-raising devices. 
Import  and export tax revenues,  which were  comparatively large in the late 46 
colonial period,  were  zero in 1828.  Furthermore,  revenues  from  domestic  taxes 
accounted for only 30%  of total government  revenues.  Most  domestic  tax 
revenues  resulted from  taxation in kind.  The tithe,  in particular,  accounted 
for  86%  of  domestic  tax revenues.  On  the other hand,  over  60%  of government 
revenues  came  from non-tax sources,  rents of state lands  and other property as 
well  as  sales of state products to the public and to troops.  I  will now 
examine  these in greater detail,  beginning with rents of state lands.  127 
a.  Rents  of State Lands.  A list of ejido rentals for  1832  lists 160 
homestead,  leased for  a  total of  395  pesos,  or an average of  2.5 pesos each 
per year.  A  similar list for  1839  includes  174  homesteads  leased for  a  total 
of  359  pesos,  for an  average of 2.1 pesos  each.  The  numbers  seem  to suggest 
that the ejido rental rates were  falling in the eighteen thirties but the 
number  of observations is too small  to conclude that they were,  which would be 
consistent with what  we  know about  the behavior of international trade.  128 
Reference  has  already been made  to the transfers  from  mayordomos  of 
pueblos  that appear  on the receipt side  for the first time  in 1828.  Such 
transfers also appear in every subsequent year  for which there is budget  data 
except  1834.  These  transfers are fairly substantial in 1831  and  1832,  1835, 
1838  (especially),  1839,  and  1840.129 
Consider now  sales of state products to the public.  Available figures 
indicate that in 1828  merchandise sales were  five  times  larger than sales of 
agricultural products  and livestock,  the reverse of what  was  the  case  in 1820, 
when  farm products  outweighed merchandise  sales  13  to 1.  According to White's 
budget  figures,  in 1828,  1829,  1831,  and 1832  merchandise sales exceeded sales 
of agricultural products and animals.  There  were no merchandise sales  in 1833, 
but  they  resumed  in 1834.  From  1835  on,  merchandise sales outstripped those of 
agricultural products and livestock every year.  130  Steel appeared as  a 46 
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indicate that in 1828  merchandise sales were  five  times  larger than sales of 
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when  farm products  outweighed merchandise  sales  13  to 1.  According to White's 
budget  figures,  in 1828,  1829,  1831,  and 1832  merchandise sales exceeded sales 
of agricultural products and animals.  There  were  no merchandise sales  in 1833, 
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separate  item under  SSPP  in 1833,  iron and medicines  in 1835,  to which 
"glassware and crockery"  were  added  in 1837  and  "salt"  in 1839.  "English 
linen"  appeared as  a  new  item in 1840.  The  merchandise  in question was  sold in 
state stores,  of  which there were as many as  five or six in 1826.  131 
Francia created new  taxes  in the  twenties,  but seems  to have  abolished 
them  in the thirties,  as  well  as  to have  reduced the rates of taxes  inherited 
from the colonial period,  sometimes  to zero.  For  example,  the  "derecho  de 
ventajet "  according to White  a  tax on cattle brought for sale to Asunci6n  t 
operated between  1823  and 1832,  and a  new  tax on tanneries was  created between 
1826  28.  Francia also replaced the tithe by the  "contribuci6n fructuaria de 
invierno y  verano,"  lowered the alcabala  (sales  tax)  from  4%  to  2%,  and 
abolished the  "estanco"  (a  3%  tax on yerba according to White)  in 1830.  In 
1835  Francia further reduced the alcabala from  2%  to  1%  and  the contribuci6n 
from  5%  to 4%.  In  1837,  the contribuci6n de  invierno was  eliminated.  132  That 
the  "derecho de  ventaje"  and  the tax on  tanneries  were  in force during  a 
period roughly coincident with that of land confiscations and trade with 
Brazil may  be significant,  as  may  also be  the fact that most  tax reductions 
carne  in the decade of  the thirties  t  after the state's direct participation in 
production became significant,  and that  some  of these  changes  coincided with a 
40%  drop  in prices observed between  1829  and 1832.  133 
These  tax reductions  have  been interpreted as  a  fall in the  tax burden, 
or as  a  tax decrease for  the freeholder at the expense of slave labour.134 
In the first connection,  notice that the diezmo  was  replaced by the 
contribuci6n fructuaria de  invierno y  verano after two yearly harvests again 
became  the norm.  Since  the diezmo amounted  to  10%  of  a  single yearly harvest 
and  the  contribuci6n fructuaria was  5%  of the  summer  and  5%  of the winter 
cropst  if the single crop amounted  to about  the  same  as  the  two  yearly crops 
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put together,  the transition from  the diezmo  to the contribuci6n need not have 
involved  any fall in the physical  amount  of produce collected in kind from 
producers.  On  the contrary,  provided the  two harvests  added up  to more  than 
the single crop had  -ceteris paribus- the absolute  amount  of tax revenues 
collected by the government  may have  increased.  The  harvests of  1833  in fact 
seems  to have  been particularly good according to Wisner. 135  In such a  case 
government  auctioning of agricultural produce  would have  lowered its price.  A 
government  that anticipated this effect would try to keep grain off the 
market.  The  reduction in the rates of the contribuci6n fructuaria and the 
alcabala,  therefore,  may  have  been due to the fact that the physical  amounts 
collected at the old rates were  too high.  In the  second connectiont  it is 
clear that state coercion of  labour  increased.  However,  it is not  clear that 
the peasantry's fiscal burden  -defined as  the ratio of peasants'  tax 
contributions to income- decreased during the Francia years as  compared to 
preceding years,  even during the thirties.  The  tax burden may be  said to have 
decreased only if the state had used surplus resources  that would otherwise 
have  remained  unemployed to produce goods it would  otherwise have  had  to 
finance  through direct or indirect taxation.  In this case both employment  of 
resources and total output may  be  said to have  increasedt  which clearly is not 
what  happened  in the period under study.  To  the extent that the state's 
economic  role increased as  a  result of the expropriation of scarce resources 
that the private sector would have put to more efficient use,  which is in fact 
what  happened t  the tax burden must  be  regarded as  having  increased. 
These  data suggest that the state auctioned off confiscated assets as 
time  went  on.  Once  the stock of confiscated assets  was  depleted,  state stores 
sold agricultural products and animals  to the public,  though they eventually 
engaged  in the sale of  imported foreign  items at prices reflecting the 49 
government's  monopoly position as  a  foreign  trade intermediary.  That  is,  for 
the revenues  yielded by taxes  levied in kind over cattle and agricultural 
products,  whose prices had fallen,  the state substituted the profits  from 
exports and  from  the sale of monopoly priced irnports.  136 
b.  Government  spending patterns during the late twenties and thirties 
were  similar to that in evidence in earlier years,  i.e.,  most  government  funds 
were  devoted to the military.  Table  2  gives available figures  for military 
spending  and  troop strength.  Military expenditures for all but  one  year of 
this period oscillated between  84  and  95  per cent of total government 
spending.  In the  one  year for  which they were  below  80%  (1934),  they absorbed 
74%  of total government  spending. 
c.  High military spending strained government  finances  to the point of 
seeming  to drive government  budget deficits.137  As  before these deficits 
were  shored up  by fines,  forced contributions,  and confiscations,  which 
sometimes  allowed the government  budget  to show  a  surplus.  In 1829, 
confiscations amounted to 19,992  pesos.  The  government  surplus  was  14,503 
pesos.138  There  were,  however,  years  in which the government  budget  showed 
a  surplus even  though confiscations were minimal.  In 1828,  for example, 
confiscations were  only 2573  pesos while the government  budget  surplus  was 
45,449 pesos.  However,  the government  budget  surplus of 1828  seems  to have 
been absorbed in 1829  by higher military expenditures and  a  reduction in tax 
139 revenues.  The deficit of  1833  appears  to have elicited a  reduction of 
military expenditures of slightly over  a  third in 1834,  as well  as  renewed 
forced contributions.  Had it not  been for  forced contributions,  however,  that 
year's government  budget  surplus would have  been  a  deficit.  In the following 
year,  1835,  forced contributions were minimal,  but state inheritance and 
confiscations  from the Church rose again,  though not  enough to avert  a 50 
deficit.  There is no  government  budget data for  1836  in secondary sources,  but 
in 1837  nominal  tax revenues  amounted to about half of what  they were  in 1835 
in absolute terms,  and to 8.87%  of total government  revenues  (as  opposed to 
almost  28%  in 1835).  Confiscations again accounted for  37.4%  of total 
government  revenues,  forced  contributions and state inheritance being 
negligible.  Nevertheless,  the deficit widened. 140  Two  of the next  three 
years were  covert deficit years.  That is,  they would  have  been deficit years 
had not  revenues  from  confiscations,  state inheritance,  forced contributions 
or another such forced exaction increased.  In the third year,  1839,  the 
deficit was  overt. 
Section 5.  Conclusions. 
The  late colonial trade expansion did lead owners  of abundant  factors, 
and producers and exporters of goods  using those factors  intensively,  to seek 
to advance their interests,  that is,  more  representative governments  as well 
as  freer  trade and  federation,  in a  manner  consistent with expectations 
derived  from  Rogowski's  theoretical  framework.  However,  federative efforts 
that,  if successful,  would  have  further  expanded the gains  from  trade and 
promoted economic  development predictably collapsed as  a  result of the free 
rider problem and  the resulting collective action failure.  The  equally 
predictable trade blockades  and threat of  invasion in turn led to trade 
contraction,  government  fiscal crises,  recession,  and the rise of secessionist 
tendencies  rooted in the small peasantry,  themselves  consistent with 
expectations derived from  Rogowski's  framework.  Capitalizing on the  consequent 
changes  in relative strengths of political groups,  political entrepreneurs 
came  to power  and enforced policies very different  from  those the  movement  for 
independence  had initially advocated.  Militarism,  absolutism,  and mercantilist 51 

state regulation all increased subsequently,  and  the country plunged further 
into recession.  However,  the property rights distribution remained fairly much 
that of the late colonial period,  though  some  alterations did take place 
affecting Spaniards and creoles  from other provinces.  The  upshot of the decade 
of the  1810s'  may  be  said to have  been an absolutist restoration,  in the 
political sphere  in particular. 
The  neocolonial order consolidated itself in the  1820s 
l  through 1 
political repressions,  confiscations 1  and land expropriations by which the 
government  sought to ameliorate its budgetary crises when  foreign  trade 
conditions  improved.  The property rights structure,  consequently,  suffered 
much  more drastic alterations than  in the previous decade,  but the extent to 
which it became  skewed  towards  the state should not be  exaggerated.  Though 
private property in land was  seriously circumscribedl  it did not disappear.  In 
addition to owning much of the country's  land,  the state also became  much  more 
of  a  cattle rancher and a  rent collecting landlord than it had been  in the 
previous  decade,  much  like its opponents  had been  and at their expense. 
Henceforth it would have  a  much  bigger say in whether or not people  became 
landlords.  Furthermore,  state interests took precedence over those of its 
purported supporters,  the  small  peasantry.  The  few  forms  of political 
representation that had developed during the colonial period became  fewer.  The 
government  thus obtained an economic base of its own  much greater than it had 
ever possessed before,  from which it could obtain tax revenues without 
consulting with contributors  1  representatives.  In addition,  its power to tax 
contributors without their consent also  increased.  The  bulk of government 
revenues,  before and after the confiscations,  were  devoted to assuring the 
Army's  support,  which  was  used to further decrease the government's  domestic 
political competition,  that  iS I  increase its monopoly position in the 52 
political sphere,  a  fact that reflected itself in the rate of  exchange  of 
revenues  for government  services.  Rule  making  power  thus  remained  firmly in 
government  hands,  which exercised it without having to obtain the consent of 
the taxed.  Consequently,  the government  could become  more  autonomous  from  that 
sector of the population which  was  largely responsible  for originally bringing 
it to power,  the small peasantry,  as  well  as  from bigger landlords,  among  whom 
opposition to the  regime  had always  been stronger. 
Republican only nominally,  this government  lacked forms  of popular 
representation that were  commonplace  in constitutional monarchies  and 
eliminated some  forms  of representation that had been  long standing features 
of the colonial period.  Its political structure more  closely resembled an 
absolute monarchy.  Colonial  absolutism,  militarism,  and mercantilist economic 
regulation persisted after independence  and were  exacerbated in the short 
run.  141 
However,  the  fact that the state may be  regarded as  autonomous  does  not 
mean  that its economic policies achieved any sort of  "autonomous  development," 
as  has  been argued.  The  word autonomous  suggests that external  forces  played 
no role  in bringing about  the changes  that took place,  which our preceding 
descriptions suggest was  not  the case.  Moreover,  the  changes  in property 
rights and political institutions that took place in the eighteen twenties,  in 
particular,  may  be  said to have  constituted a  veritable institutional 
regression.  If we  also consider the economy's performance  between  the  1810s 
and the  1830s,  it is rather difficult to maintain that any  "development"  took 
place.  Thus,  the  two  words  in the expression  "autonomous  development"  simply 
should not be used together,  perhaps  should not be used at all,  when  speaking 
of Paraguay's  economic  performance under Francia. 
Similarly,  the expression  "state socialism," if it is intended to 
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suggest an early experiment with a  more  advanced  form  of social organization, 
is not applicable to Paraguay during the period at issue.  The  state during 
Francia's  regime  held extensive rights on land and regulated economic activity 
much like socialist economies  did,  and consequently resembled  a  socialist 
economy.  In these respects,  however,  it mainly followed  colonial precedent.  In 
other words,  there was  path dependence.  142  Therefore,  the period's political 
economic  system considered as  a  whole  is more  appropriately characterized as 
neomercantilist and,  therefore,  conservative in nature.  143 
The  institutional forms  put in place by Francia persisted beyond his 
death in 1840  and  waned only slowly over the  long run.  The absolutist state 
reaped great benefits  from  Rosas'  defeat at Caseros  and  the subsequent  opening 
of the  Parana-Paraguay river system to free navigation.  The  ensuing export 
boom  and associated economic  expansion allowed the state to increase 
expenditures on  the military and on the transportation and  communication 
infrastructure,  as  well as on  a  "capital goods"  industry,  with a  view to 
increasing exports  and defending the gains  from perceived foreign aggressors. 
A  large share of the increased income  accrued to the  family that had  corne  to 
control the state at Francia's death,  which therefore sought  to perpetuate 
itself in power.  144  The  dynasty,  however,  lasted for only two  generations 
and  was  brought to an  end by the Triple Alliance  War. 
After 1870 militarism,  absolutism,  and mercantilism relinquished their 
hold only slowly.  Although the Liberal Party rose to power  in 1904, 
representative democracy and  a  laissez-faire economy did not take hold until 
the 1920's,  and  had  a  short life span;  they did not survive the Great 
Depression and  the  Chaco  War. 14S  The  February 1936  coup marked  the beginning 
of the process that returned militarism,  absolutism,  and mercantilism to 
Paraguay until the late nineteen eighties.  146  Whether  representative 
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democracy and  a  laissez-faire economy will prevail in Paraguay in the nineteen 
nineties is still an open question.  If the experience of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century is any indication,  past forms  of political absolutism 
and  economic mercantilism will hang on  for dear life.  Lessons  derived  from the 
study of past transitional periods may  help lessen their grip,  however. 66 
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Carlos  Sempat Assadourian t  El  sistema de la economia  colonial:  mercado  interno, 
regiones,  y  espacio economico  (Lima,  1982)  p.116,  footnote  9;  Juan Carlos 
Garavaglia,  Mercado  interno y  economia colonial  (Mexico,  1983) i  and Thomas  L. 
Whigham,  The  Politics of River Trade:  Tradition and Development  in the Upper 
Plata  (1780-1870)  (Albuquerque,  1991). 
4.Caves'  formalization stripped the staple growth theory of its institutional 
aspects,  which North and Thomas  sought  to reintroduce by resorting to 
transactions costs in D.C.North and R.P.Thomas,  "An  Economic  Theory of the Growth 
of the Western World,"  The  Economic History Review  2nd series,  Vol  23,  n°  1 67 

(April  1970) :1-17.  As  they themselves  recognized,  their effort would have  been 
more  successful had a  theory of the state been available.  Elsewhere  North and 
Thomas  discussed the rise of private property rights on land and North provided 
the first statement of the missing  theory of the state,  which  focuses  on 
predatory states.  See Douglass North and Robert  Thomas,  "The  Rise and Fall of the 
Manorial  Economy:  A Theoretical Model,"  Journal of  Economic  History vol  31  n04 
(December  1971) :777-80,  and Douglass North,  Structure and Change  in Economic 
History  (New  York;  1981),  Ch.  3.  More  recent discussions  can be  found, 
respectively,  in David Feeney,  "The  Development  of  Property Rights  in Land:  A 
Comparative Study,"  in Robert  H.  Bates  (editor)  Toward  a  Political Economy  of 
Development,  a  Rational  Choice  Perspective  (Berkeley,  1989)  and Thrainn 
Eggertsson  Economic  Behavior and  Institutions  (New  York,  1989).  These theoretical 
sources  are offered to facilitate comprehension of the problem at hand only,  not 
as  a  source  from  which to derive implications testable by econometric methods. 
Such  a  test -though conceivably possible- would require much  more  statistical 
data than is available.  The  most  one  can expect is a  rough correspondence between 
theory and evidence. 
5.See Ronald Rogowski,  "Political Cleavages  and  Changing  Exposure  to Trade," 
American Political Science Review Vol.  81,  n°  4  (December  1987)  and Commerce  and 
Coalitions.  How  Trade Affects  Domestic Political Alignments  (Princeton,  NJ, 
1989);  Wolfang  Stolper and Paul  Samuelson,  "Protection and Real  Wages,"  Review 
of  Economic  Studies  (1942);  and Mancur  Olson,  The  Logic  of Collective Action. 
Public Goods  and the Theory of Groups  (Cambridge,  MA,  1965)  and The  Rise and 
Decline of Nations  (New  Haven,  CT,  1982). 
6.The  approaches  to the late colonial and early national period are,  in 
principle,  compatible.  Caves  opened Ricardo's two-sector model  and worked out  the 
comparative static implications of an  increase in the supply of  land when  factors 
are allowed to move.  Rogowski  extended Stolper and Samuelson'S  (1942)  solution 
to issues arising in Heckscher  and Olin's neoclassical  reformulation of Ricardo's 
comparative  advantage  theorem,  which  assumes  factors  are not mobile across 
countries.  Caves'  Ricardian construct may  be  made  complatible with Rogowski's  by 
extending Ricardo's marginal principle to factors of production other than land 
a  la Wicksteed.  Once  this is accomplished,  both approaches differ mainly as to 
factor mobility. 
7.See  Douglass North and Barry Weingast,  "Constitutions and Commitment:  The 
Evolution of Public Choice  Institutions Governing  Public Choice in Seventeenth 
Century England,"  Journal of  Economic  History 49 n°  4  (December  1989) :203-832. 
8.Jean Batou,  Cent ans  de  resistance au sous-developpment:  l'industrialisation 
du  Moyen  Orient et de  l'Amerigue latine face  au defi europeen  (Geneve,  1989), 
pp.460-461. 
9.Batou,  Cent  ans,  pp.460-461. 
10.See Richard Alan White,  Paraguay's Autonomous  Revolution  (Albuquerque,  1978) i 
John Hoyt  Williams,  The  Rise and Fall of the  Paraguayan Republic,  1800-1870 
(Austin,  Texas,  1979) i  and Vera Blinn Reber,  "Commerce  and Industry in Nineteenth 
Century Paraguay:  The  Example  of Yerba Mate",  The Americas,  vol.  XLII,  (July 
1985),  n.  1;  "The  Demographics  of the  Paraguay:  A Reinterpretation of the Great 
War,  1864-70,"  Hispanic American Historical Review vol  68,  n02,  (1988) :289-319; 
and Modernization  from Within.  Trade  and Development  in Paraguay,  1810  to 1870 
(forthcoming).  Williams  does  not use  dependency theory.  He  is included in the 
school because he  characterizes the period as one of state socialism.  Both White 
and Reber  have been influenced by Bradford Burns.  White's  book  was  based on the 
doctoral dissertation he wrote under Burns at the University of California at Los 
Angeles.  Richard Huston,  another student of Burns',  has  just completed a  second 
dissertation on Francia.  See  "Folk and State in Paraguay:  Political Order and 
Social Disorder."  (Ph.D.  dissertation,  University of California at Los  Angeles, 
1993).  Until this work  becomes  available to researchers,  one  can only speculate 
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as to whether it mayor may  not be classified as  a  revisionist piece. 
11.Therelated Argentine revisionist school has  been analyzed by Tulio Halperin 
Donghi  in EI  revisionismo hist6rico argentino  (Mexico,  1971).  For  a 
historiographical discussion of the nineteenth century literature see  White, 
Paraguay's Autonomous  Revolution,  pp.  7-13,  of the twentieth century literature 
see M.S.AI'perovich,  "La dictadura del Dr.  Francia en la historiografia del siglo 
XX,"  Estudios  Latinoamericanos Vol  5  (1979) :87-96. 
12.Most of White's quantitative data may  be  found  in Appendices  A  through H,  pp. 
179-264,  but  see also,  p.  95  and passim.  White's  and Williams'  data were  gathered 
independently.  The  majority of subsequent contributors have  been friendly to the 
revisionist school.  Prominent  among  them is Reber.  Critics have  been much  fewer. 
Thomas  L.  Whigham,  Politics of River Trade is a  recent  such attempt but overlooks 
most  of the  fundamental  weaknesses  of the revisionist analysis to which this 
paper calls attention. 
13.A proponent of  dependency theory as  a  useful  tool for analyzing  Paraguayan 
history has  recently gone  further;  Diego Abente asserts that  "Dr.  White's  work 
is a  fine piece of research full of archival data.  Some  of  the  conclusions he 
draws,  however,  are derived  from  a  preconceived theoretical  framework  rather than 
from  the facts  themselves.  Although Dr.  White's  arguments  are  limited to the 
dictatorship of Francia,  the tendency of the revisionist literature is to 
extrapolate them to the L6pez  period as well."  See  "Foreign Capital,  Economic 
Elites,  and  the State in Paraguay during  the Liberal Republic  (1870-1936) ," 
Journal of Latin American Studies Vol.  21  (February 1989),  p.  72,  ftnt.  22. 
However,  Abente did not  substantiate any part of this claim.  Clearly,  such  a 
charge  requires evidentiary support to stand. 
14.Neither does  the available evidence support claims of  a  spectacular 
industrialization process between 1852  and 1870.  Actually,  it suggests  an 
alternative set of hypotheses.  See Mario  Pastore,  "State and  Industrialization 
in Nineteenth Century Latin America:  the  Evidence  on Paraguay Reconsidered," 
Journal of Latin American Studies  (May  1994) . 
15.0n institutional innovation in Holland see Douglass  C.  North  and Robert  P. 
Thomas,  The  Rise of the Western World  (New  York,  1973),  in England,  North and 
Weingast,  "Constitutions and Commitment". 
16.The  renewed economic expansion of the River Plate region in the first half of 
the eighteenth century is discussed by Magnus  Marner,  "Panorama de  la sociedad 
del  Rio  de la Plata durante la primera mitad del siglo XVIII,"  Estudios 
Americanos  Revista de  la Escuela de  Estudios Hispanoamericanos,  Sevilla.  Vol. 
XVII,  n°  92-93  (Mayo-Junio  1959) :203-216.  Economic  conditions in Paraguay in the 
same  period may  be discerned  from Rafael Eladio Velazquez,  "Navegaci6n paraguaya 
de  los siglos XVII  Y XVIII,"  Estudios  Paraguayos Vol.  I  (November  1973):  45-84, 
Juan Bautista Rivarola Paoli,  La  economia colonial  (Asunci6n,  1986),  and 
Branislava Susnik Una  visi6n socio-antropo16gica del Paraguay del siglo XVIII 
(Asunci6n,  1991),  pp.7-59. 
17.For the Bourbonic Reforms  see John Lynch,  Spanish Colonial Administration 
1782-1810;  The  Intendent in the Viceroyalty of the Rio  de  la Plata  (London, 
1958).  Garavaglia analyzes  the late colonial regional specialization in Juan 
Carlos Garavaglia,  "Economic  Growth  and Regional Differentiation:  The  River  Plate 
Region at the  End  of  the Eighteenth Century,"  Hispanic American Historical Review 
vol  65,  n°  1  (1985) :51-89,  but  the paper  does  not discuss  Paraguay.  Conditions 
in pre-Edict Paraguay were described in Governor  Pinedo's  1773  and  1777  reports 
to the king,  excerpted in White,  Paraguay's Autonomous  Revolution,  pp.17-21.  For 
a  summary of  conditions in Paraguay after the Edict see Jerry W.  Cooney,  "An 
Ignored Aspect of the Viceroyalty of the River Plate,"  Intercambio Internacional 
/ 69 

Vol.  2,  n01  (January 1977) :10-13.  For more detail see Jerry W.  Cooney,  Economia 
y  sociedad en la Intendencia del  Paraguay  (Asunci6n,  1990). 
18.For insightful  comments  and further sources  on  the military reorganization in 
the  Province of Buenos  Aires  see David  Rock,  Argentina.  1516-1980:  From 
Colonization to the Falklands'  War  (Berkeley,  1985);  in Paraguay,  John Hoyt 
Williams,  "From the Barrel of a  Gun:  Some  Notes  on  Dr.  Francia and  Paraguayan 
Militarism,"  proceedings of the American Philosophical Society Vol.  119,  n°  1 
(February 1975) :73-86,  and Jerry W.  Cooney,  "The  Paraguayan  Independence 
Movement,  1806-1814,"  (Ph.D.  dissertation,  The  University of  New  Mexico, 
Albuquerque,  NM,  1971). 
19.0ne arroba equals  twenty five pounds.  For the 1776  figure see Efraim Cardozo, 
EI  Paraguay colonial:  las raices de la nacionalidad  (Buenos  Aires,  1959),  p.106; 
for  the  1792-1796  averages  see  "Tabla de Comercio, "  in 
Felix de Azara,  Descripci6n e  historia del  Paraguay y  del  Rio  de  la Plata in 
Biblioteca Indiana.  Viajes por la America del Sur Vol.  2  (Madrid:  1847,  1962), 
pp.  313-314),  and  for the 1803-1807  averages  see  "Raz6n  de  los Tercios de yerva 
que  salieron de esta Provincia en el ultimo quinquenio, "  Ministros  de  R.I 
Hacienda  Pedro  de  Oscariz and Jose de Elizalde,  Asunci6n,  November  28,  1898,  in 
ANA-NE  1790,  both cited in Jerry W.  Cooney,  "Serving the Hinterland:  The 
Commercial  Rise of Asuncion,  1776-1810,"  SECOLAS  Annals vol.  XVIII  (March  1987), 
p.  90,  footnote  46  and p.  91,  footnote  48,  respectively.  Cooney also provides 
figures  on total exports  and  imports. 
20.Slavery first characterized Paraguay's early colonial economy but was  replaced 
in mid sixteenth century by two versions of  a  form  of  serfdom,  the encomienda 
yanacona,  which disguised the earlier slavery,  and the  encomienda mitaria,  more 
akin to European  serfdom.  Mita  Indians  were  confined to Franciscan and,  later, 
to Jesuit missions.  Both these  forms  of the  encomienda  had declined noticeably 
by the 1630's and,  eventually,  Jesuit missions  were  exempt  from the encomienda 
mitaria.  Elsewhere,  the  stagnant encomiendas persisted throughout  the colonial 
period,  though most  had  reverted to the  crown  towards  the  end of the eighteenth 
century.  For  the  encomiendas  see Mario  Pastore,  "Trabalho  forc;ado  indigena e 
campesinato  mestic;o  livre no  Paraguai colonial:  uma  visao de  suas  causas baseada 
na  teoria da procura de  rendas  economicas, "  Revista Brasileira de  Historia Vol. 
11,  n021  (set/fev.  1990/91) :147-185,  English version in J.Brewer and S.Staves 
(eds.)  Early Modern  Conceptions of Property  (London,  forthcoming). 
21.For state enterprises,  see Jerry W.  Cooney,  "A  Colonial  Naval  Industry:  The 
Fabricas  de  Cables of Paraguay",  Revista de  Historia de  America  vol.  87,  (Enero 
- Junio  1979);  "Paraguayan Astilleros and  the Platine Merchant Marine, 
1796-1806,"  (1980) :55-74:  and  "La  Direcci6n General  de  la Renta  de 
Tabacos  and the Decline of the Royal  Trade  Monopoly in Paraguay.  1779-1800," 
Colonial Latin American Historical Review Vol  1,  n01  (1992) :101-116;  for  a  hint 
that state enterprises relied on  indigenous  coerced labor see James  Schofield 
Saeger,  "Survival  and Abolition:  The  Eighteenth Century Paraguayan  Encomienda." 
The  Americas  Vol  28,  (July),  pp.59-85;  for the private sector's use of African 
slaves see Josefina PIa,  Hermano  Negro.  La  Esclavitud en el Paraguay  (Madrid: 
1972) . 
22.0n immigration,  Jerry W.  Cooney,  "Foreigners in the Intendencia of  Paraguay", 
The  Americas vol  XXXIX  (1982-83) :333-358;  Rene  Ferrer de Arrellaga,  Un  siglo de 
expansi6n colonizadora:  los origenes de Concepci6n  (Asunci6n,  1985).  On  internal 
migration,  see Juan Francisco de Aguirre,  "Diario..  "  Revista de  la Biblioteca 
Nacional  de  Buenos Aires  nOs.  17-20,  1949-51. 
On  the new  towns,  Rafael Eladio Velazquez  EI  Paraguay en  1811  (Asunci6n,  1965) i 
Jose Luis  Mora  Merida,  "La demografia colonial paraguaya,"  Jahrbuch fur 
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(1974),  p.  76;  Ferrer de Arrellaga,  Exoansi6n colonizadora;  Alfredo Viola,  Origen 
de  Pueblos  del  Paraguay  (Asunci6n,  1986).  See also Jerry W.  Cooney,  liThe  Yerba 
Mate  and Cattle Frontier of Paraguay 1776-1811:  Social,  Economic,  and  Political 
Impact ...  Paper presented at the XIV  Int'l Congress  of the Latin American Studies 
Association,  New  Orleans,  LA,  17-19  March  1988. 
23.Peasants devoted  themselves  to agriculture during the fall and winter.  They 
sowed  tobacco  in Mayor June  and by September they were  usually finished 
transplanting the  seedlings,  "though the operation sometimes  continued for  two 
more  months."  They labored in the yerba trade during the hottest months  of  the 
year,  October  through May.  For  the timing of  tobacco activities,  see  Thomas  L. 
Whigham,  "The  Politics of River Commerce  in the Upper  Plata,  1760-1865,"  (Ph.D. 
Dissertation,  Stanford University,  1986),  p.  175,  for that of yerba harvesting, 
see  Reber,  "Commerce  and Industry," p.  33. 
24.For the expansion of hardwood  and  tobacco production see Jerry W.  Cooney,"A 
Colonial Naval  Industry:  The  Fabricas de  Cables of Paraguay",  Revista  de Historia 
de  America vol.  87,  (Enero  - Junio  1979)  and  "Forest  Industries  and  Trade  in Late 
Colonial  Paraguay,"  Journal of Forest Industries vo1.23  1  n04  (October  1979) :186­
197.  The  modern  economic  theory of  common  property resource use originates with 
H.  Scott Gordon 1  "The  Economic  Theory of  a  Common  Pool  Resource:  The  Fishery," 
Journal  of Political Economy  Vol.  LXII  (1954). 
25.The  small peasantry's family-sized  farms  sprung up in the sixteenth century 
alongside  the relatively larger estates worked mostly by Spaniards  with 
encomienda labor 1  the  lands of the  towns  of Spaniards and of  Indians,  and  the 
royal  lands.  The peasantry became progressively more  important after the  1630 / s. 
However 1  in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries  increased cattle 1 
ranching,  population growth,  the transformation of Jesuit mission Indians  into 
peasants  following  the Order1s  1767  expulsion 1  and the Bourbonic liberalization 
of trade of the late l770 / s  in particular 1  led to increased land concentration, 
the appearance of  land tenancy and agricultural wage  labor.  The  displacement of 
small peasants  from their farms  pushed the frontier farther out.  See  Pastore 1 
"Trabalho  for<;:ado  indigena." 
26.Yerba gatherers  fed  on the cattle,  packed the yerba mate  in sacks  made  of 
hides,  and transported the yerba itself to riverain ports by oxen.  Loggers also 
used cattle in their operations.  Rivarola Paoli 1  La  economia colonial gives  a 
list of late colonial  ranches  formed  in the area the Jesuits had previously 
occupied.  Garavaglia,  Mercado  interno,  discusses barreros.  For  Paraguay/s  status 
as  a  net  importer of cattle in the late colonial period see Thomas  L.  Whigham 1 
"Cattle Raising in the Argentine Northeast:  Corrientes,  1750-1870,"  Journal  of 
Latin American Studies Vol.  20  (November  1988) :313-335. 
27.See Rafael  Eladio Velazquez  1  "Organizaci6n militar de la Gobernaci6n y 
Capitania General del Paraguay 1  "  Estudios  Paraguayos  Vol.  V,  n01  (Junio  1977) :25­
68  for the expansion of forts  and Ferrer de Arrellaga  Expansi6n colonizadora for l 
military status and  land ownership in Concepci6n. 
28.For the financial activities of the  Church see White,  Paraguay/s  Autonomous 
Revolution.  Asunci6n merchants  could pay for their purchases  in Buenos  Aires with 
"libranzas," drafts drawn against their balances at the Royal  Tobacco monopoly 
in Asunci6n which could be presented for payment at the Renta's offices  in Buenos 
Aires.  For silver hoarding 1  see Jerry W.  Cooney,  "The  Carrera del  Paraguay,  1770­
1810:  Lifeline of the Platine Littoral  "  paper presented at the Southern 1 
Historical Association Meetings,  1988.  For  statements on price inflation see 
Aguirre  1  "Diario..  "  cited in Cooney,  "Serving the Hinterland:  p.91  1  footnote  56. 
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29.Product estimates like those proposed for the united states by Gallman and 
David have been put  forth for Mexico  by Coatsworth as well  as  by Richard and 
Linda Salvucci  for Mexico,  for  EI  Salvador by Lindo  Fuentes.  However,  I  am  aware 
of no  such series for the Viceroyalty of the River Plate or any of countries that 
emerged in the region after its dissolution,  though Coria has  made  an attempt for 
Mendoza  in the first decade of  the nineteenth century.  See  Robert  Gallman,  "The 
Pace  and Pattern of American  Economic  Growth,"  in Lance  Davis  and et aI,  American 
Economic  Growth  (1972) :33--39;  Paul  David,  "The Growth of Real  Product  in the 
United States Before  1840:  New  Evidence,  Controlled Conjectures,"  Journal of 
Economic  History vol.  XXVI,  n°  2,  (June  1967);  John Coatsworth,  "Obstacles  to 
Change  in Nineteenth Century Mexico,"  American Historical Review  (1978);  Richard 
and Linda  Salvucci,  "Las  consecuencias  economicas  de  la independencia mexicana," 
in Prados  and Amaral,  La  independencia americana  (Madrid,  1993) :31-53;  Hector 
Lindo  Fuentes,  "Nineteenth Century Economomic  History of EI  Salvador,"  (ph.D. 
dissertation,  University of Chicago,  1984);  and Luis  A.  Coria,  "Determinacion del 
P.B.I de  Mendoza para 1807,"  in Anales  del A.A.E.P,  XXIII  Reunion Anual  Vol.  1., 
1988. 
30.See Jerry W.  Cooney,  "Criollos and Peninsulares  in the  Intendencia of 
Paraguay:  Elite Accomodation  in Place of Conflict."  Dpt.  of History,  University 
of Louisville,  (n.d.). 
31.This pattern contrasted with similar provinces on other Indian frontiers  such 
as Chile,  where  the  crown stationed a  large standing army;  military power, 
therefore,  was  more  concentrated,  and in the hands of the colonial 
administration. 
32.For the  "special dispensation"  see Efraim Cardozo,  Efemerides  de la historia 
del  Paraguay  (Asuncion:  1967);  for  the Comuneros  Revolt,  see James  Schofield 
Saeger,  "Origins of the Rebellion of Paraguay,"  Hispanic American Historical 
Review Vol.  52  (May  1972) :215-229;  Adalberto Lopez,  The  Revolt  of the Comuneros, 
1721-1735:  A Study in Colonial History of Paraguay  (Cambridge,  MA,  1976),  and 
Juan Carlos Garavaglia Economia,  Sociedad y  Regiones  (Buenos  Aires:  1987),  pp. 
193-260;  for  suggestions  on  the political effects of the Reforms  see Carlos 
Pastore,  "Introduccion a  una Historia Economica  del  Paraguay en el Siglo XIX," 
Historia Paraguaya vol.  XVI  (1978),  pp.103-126  and Cooney,  "serving the 
Hinterland,"  p.  91,  ftnt.  58. 
33.The Real  Renta also had military implications.  Tobacco growers  who  agreed to 
sell it their tobacco  could be  exempted of militia duties.  See  Cooney,  "Renta de 
Tabacos." 
34.See Rock,  Argentina,  and Kline Bolivia. 
35.The  70%  estimate is Williams',  The Rise and Fall. 
36.John Hoyt  Williams  "Governor Velasco,  the Portuguese,  and the Paraguayan 
Revolution of  1811:  A New  Look,"  The  Americas  vol  28,  n04  (April  1972),  p.  444, 
puts  the amount  taken at pesos  13,180. 
37.0n the composition of the  juntas see Cooney,  "The  Paraguayan  Independence 
Movement,"  pp.  173,  191.  See also Eliana castedo Franco,  "El  proceso social de 
la revolucion del  14  de  mayo  de  1811.  Un  estudio socio-historico, "  Estudios 
Paraquayos  Vol  6  n02  (1978) :141-195.  The  two military officers were  Caballero and 
Yegros,  the representative of the mercantile elite was  de  la Mora,  of  the clergy, 
Bogarin.  For  a  quick sketch of the personal background of junta members  see Julio 
Cesar Chaves,  La  revolucion paraguaya de la independencia.  Relato y  biografia de 
los proceres  (Buenos  Aires:  1961);  more detail on Caballero's background may  be 
found  in H.  Sanchez  Quell  Pedro Juan Caballero y  otros ensayos  (Asuncion,  1984); 72 
on Yegros'  see Rafael  Eladio Velazquez,  "Los  Yegros  en la historia del  Paraguay," 
en  Fulgencio Yegros,  bicentenerio de  nacimiento,  Proceedings  of a  commemorative 
symposium  (Asunci6n,  1980),  and  in Historia Paraguaya Vol.  XVIII  (1981) :215-283; 
on de  la Mora's  see Jerry W.  Cooney,  "The Rival of Dr.  Francia:  Fernando  de  la 
Mora  and the Paraguayan Revolution,"  Revista de Historia de America  n°  100 
(Julio-Diciembre  1985) :201-229;  on  Francia,  see Julio Cesar Chaves,  El  Supremo 
Dictador  3a.  edici6n  (Buenos  Aires,  1958). 
38.See  Chaves,  El  Supremo  Dictador and White,  Paraguay's Autonomous  Revolution. 
Francia's continued presence  in the expanded  junta,  I  suggest,  may  have been 
partly due  to kinship ties between him and  some  of the other junta members. 
Francia's familial  ties with one of the military officers,  Fulgencio Yegros,  with 
the  junta's secretary Mariano Larios Galvan,  as  well as  with Antonio  Tomas 
Yegros,  Fulgencio's brother,  who  was  also active in the movement,  have been 
documented  by Julio Cesar  Chaves  in El  Supremo  Dictador and La  revoluci6n 
paraguaya,  pp.  69-73  and  85-89,  as well  as  by Rafael  Eladio Velazquez,  "Los 
Yegros .. ",  en la historia del  Paraguay,"  en Fulgencio Yegros,  bicentenerio de 
nacimiento,  Proceedings of  a  commemorative  symposium  (Asunci6n,  1980),  p.34,  and 
in Historia Paraguaya Vol.  XVIII  (1981),  pp.  249-251,  but have  been questioned 
by Benjamin Vargas  Pena,  Secreta Politica del Dictador Francia  (RepUblica 
Argentina,  1985),  p.  95. 
39.Aside  from noting the fact  that Francia's father was  born a  Portuguese 
subject,  Vargas  Pena also puts  forth evidence that Francia sponsored diplomatic 
efforts in the  1810s'  and the 1820s'  to explore the possibility of making 
Paraguay  a  protectorate of Portugal's and Spain's,  respectively.  Ramos  rejects 
the documentary validity of this thesis.  However,  Abente grants that Vargas 
Pena's  books  "make  very interesting revelations and raise important  and  long-
neglected issues,"  even if they are  "marred by a  rather simplistic,  all 
encompassing conspiratorial theory."  See Benjamin Vargas  Penal  Secreta Politica, 
pp.  8-11,  49-64,  and  93-124;  R.  Antonio  Ramos,  La politica del Brasil en el 
Paraguay bajo la dictadura del Dr.  Francia  (Buenos Aires,  1957);  and Diego 
Abente,  "The  Liberal Republic  and  the  Failure of Democracy,"  Journal  of Latin 
American Studies Vol  21  (February 1989),  p.  527.  The  subject clearly deserves 
more  research. 
40.  Yegros,  for  example.  See  Mariano Antonio Molas  Descripci6n hist6rica de  la 
antigua provincia del  Paraguay  3a.  edici6n  (Buenos  Aires,  1957). 
41.A  summary of Velazquez's description of the broader aims  of this Junta reads 
as  follows:  " ..ensenanza gratuita;  instrucci6n para el maestro de primeras letras 
ajustada a  las mas  modernas  concepciones pedag6gicas  de  la epoca,  con citas que 
demuestran la gran versaci6n de  sus autores  y  encaminada notoriamente  a  formar 
hombres  libres y  dignos;  Sociedad Patri6tica Literaria,  para  coadyuvar  a  la 
elevaci6n del nivel cultural de  la poblaci6n;  Academia Militar,  para la formaci6n 
de  los mandos  medios  y  subalternosj  expedici6n al Norte,  para expulsar  a 
invasores portugueses;  erecci6n del  Cabildo de la Villa Real  de  la Concepci6n; 
trabajos iniciales de  la fundaci6n de  la Villa del Salvador de  Taveg6  0  Eteveg6; 
supresi6n del  tributo indigena;  concesi6n para una  linea de  navegaci6n  con buques 
a  vapor.. ;  relaciones cordiales con Artigas .. ,  como  complemento  0  alternativa de 
las que  se mantenian  con  Buenos Aires;  y  una misi6n confidencial para obtener el 
levantamiento del  bloqueo realista del rio Parana..Ademas  se iniciaron gestiones 
para la adquisici6n en Buenos Aires  de  una  imprenta y  de  la biblioteca que  habia 
pertenecido a  Mariano  Moreno,  entonces  recientemente fallecido."  See  "Los 
Yegros",  pp.59-60. 73 

42.0n the agreement  with Buenos Aires  see Efraim Cardozo,  "EI  Plan Federal del 
Dr.  Francia."  (Buenos  Aires,  1941).  On  the notion that technological  innovations 
that  reduce  transportation costs are equivalent to tariff reductions  see 
Rogowski,  Commerce  and Coalitions. 
43.0n  the agreement's dissolution see  Cardozo,  "Plan federal."  I  have highlighted 
only the main  issues of contention between  the Junta and Buenos Aires. 
44.Here  I  use  the word  "rational"  in the neoclassical  economic  sense  of 
"maximizing."  The  free  rider concept is discussed at length in Olson's  Logic. 
45.For late colonial export  figures  see  Cooney,  "Serving the Hinterland,"  p.84, 
for early national exports white,  Paraguay's Autonomous  Revolution Appendices  C 
through F,  pps.  225-257.  However,  to calculate export values  for the years  in the 
period for which he did furnish data,  White used  1818 prices of  some  goods  and 
1829 prices of other goods.  Thus,  for those years  he  may  in some  sense  be  said 
to have  furnished real rather than nominal  figures,  though not  through deflating 
nominal  figures  by an index of export prices.  In addition,  White  excluded goods 
exported in relatively small quantities,  understating exports according to his 
own  calculation by as  much  as  10 per cent.  Subsequent authorst  among  them 
Whigham,  Politics of River Trade,  and Rebert  Modernization  From  Within,  have 
overlooked and  compounded the problem by using White's  figures  to compile  longer 
series  for nominal  exports  and imports.  White did not  furnish export data for 
1810-1815,  1817,  1821-28,  1833-34,  and  1836.  Nor  do his appendices  contain import 
data  for  any year of the period.  White's  figures are used here only to gain an 
idea of  the orders of magnitudes  involved in the early national trade 
contraction. 
46.Tables  2  and  3  summarize  data contained in White,  Paraguay's Autonomous 
Revolution Appendix A,  pp.  180-214.  White  arranged government  income  and 
expenditure categories differently every year,  in order of decreasing magnitude. 
I  have kept  the yearly order of categories constant and allowed the magnitudes 
to vary.  Note  that White did not  include data on government  revenues  and 
expenditures  for  1817,  1819,  1821,  1824-27,  1830,  and 1836,  although on pp.  213­
214  he himself lists the ANA  locations at which they are available. 
47.Tables  4  and  5  contain data in White,  Paraguay's Autonomous  Revolution, 
Appendix  H.  Data  on  troop strength and military allocations during this period 
also can be  found  in Williams,  "From  the Barrel".  The  findings  of  White  and 
Williams,  however,  are sometimes at odds.  For  examplet  Williams  warns  that the 
Libros  de  Caxa of the  War  Treasury between  1816  and  1827  "concerns  troops 
garrisoned in and around the capital.  Frontier troops  and  the garrisons of other 
population centers such as pilar and Ytapua,  are not mentioned in the libros de 
Caxa."  These  were  expected to be self sufficient.  See Williams,  "From the 
Barrel",  p.77.  White,  however,  in Paraguayts Autonomous  Revolution,  suggest that 
these data apply to the country as  a  whole.  Proper hypothesis testing procedure 
require that  I  use White's figures,  because  they may  be underestimates  of true 
values  on  troop strength and military allocations.  They also cover a  wider period 
(between  1816  and  1823).  However t  I  will use White's  figures  to suggest the 
orders of magnitude  involved only.  Where  possible,  I  will  supplement White's 
figures with those of Williams'  and other sources.  Again,  this procedure may  be 
questionable,  but not if the purpose is to suggest orders of magnitude. 
48.Just as  the  reforms of  1801  may  be said to have given origin to the early 
Paraguayan military,  measures by Governor Velazco -his requisition of  "a  number 
of merchant  ships in the Asuncion harbor"- may  be said to have given rise to the 
Paraguayan Navy.  These  ships  "were  armed,  many of  them with cannon,"  and were 
devoted to the expedition against Corrientes in 1811  and to patrolling the 
Parana.  However,  and despite the riverain blockades  imposed by Buenos Aires 
beginning in 1812,  "little was  done  to strengthen the flotilla for several years" 
according to Williams,  "From the Barrel",  p.84. 74 

49.White,  Paraguay's Autonomous  Revolution,  p.104.  Government  budgets  show that 
the government  spent  funds  for  "construction of ships"  in 1816  and  1818,  pesos 
8,551  and 6,622,  respectively.  See White,  Paraguay's  Autonomous  Revolution pps. 
182  and  184.  This is consistent with the fact that a  Paraguayan naval  force 
bombarded Corrientes  in 1818,  in retaliation for the earlier seizure of several 
Paraguayan merchant  ships.  Expenditures on  shipbuilding continued in 1819  and 
1820,  when  the government  respectively devoted  10,724  pesos  (Williams,  "From the 
Barrel",  p.84)  and 13,615 pesos  (White,  Paraguay's  Autonomous  Revolution,  p.186) 
to that aim.  The  flotilla was  augmented by the addition of captured ships  in 
1820.  The  disaffected crew of  a  heavily armed ship belonging  to Littoral caudillo 
Francisco Ramirez  interned at Pilar and gave  itself up.  Francia refused to 
release the  ship.  See  Williams,  "From  the Barrel",  p.  84  and  85. 
50.Though total government  receipts increased from  264,000  pesos  in 1816  to 
286,000  pesos  in 1818.  See  White,  Paraguay's Autonomous  Revolution,  App.  A. 
51.Tax revenues  decreased by 72,000  pesos,  confiscations amounted to 90,107 
pesos,  and the  1818  budget  surplus to  91,712.  See White,  Paraguay's  autonomous 
Revolution,  Appendix  A. 
52.They fell  from  47,770  pesos  to 8,146  pesos,  a  drop of  83%.  Excise  taxes also 
fell,  but not in the  same proportion,  from  40,285  to  33,445  pesos.  See White, 
Paraguay's Autonomous  Revolution,  Appendix A. 
53.Which amounted to 7,729 pesos.  Merchandise sales amounted to only 650  pesos. 
See  White,  Paraguay's  Autonomous  Revolution,  Appendix A. 
54.They amount  to less than 5,000 pesos.  See White,  Paraguay's  Autonomous 
Revolution,  Appendix A. 
55. The officers probably were  much better educated and  more  familiar with their 
Buenos Aires counterparts and their innovative ideas  than revisionist and 
nationalist historians have generally been willing to concede.  The  secondary 
literature alone  suggests  as  much.  See,  for  example,  Chaves,  La  revolucion; 
Sanchez  Quell,  Pedro Juan Caballero,  and Velazquez,  "Los  Yegros".  The  Congress 
of  1814  was  supposed to have  had  1000  delegates,  though only six or seven hundred 
attended.  That of  1816  had only 150 delegates.  See  Chaves,  EI  Supremo Dictador 
(1958,  pp.  168  and 182).  Seven eights of the votes  from  the countryside favored 
Francia in the  1814  Congress.  The  1816  Congress,  however,  designated Francia 
Perpetual Dictator and  "ser sin exemplar,"  by acclamation,  without  a  vote.  See 
Francisco Wisner  de  Morgenstern,  EI  Dictador del  Paraguay.  Jose  Gaspar  de  Francia 
(Buenos Aires,  1923,  1957),  pp.  76,  90,  respectively. 
56.Matiauda at Itapua  joined Artigas.  See Williams,  The  Rise and Fall,  p.39. 
Caballero is reported to have helped convince the Congress of 1814  of the need 
to give Francia dictatorial powers  for  a  limited term.  See  Cooney,  "The 
Paraguayan  Independence Movement".  For Francia's Army  reorganization decree see 
ANA,  Seccion Historia,  Vol.  229,  N.  11,  transcribed in Alfredo Viola,  Cartas  y 
Decretos  del Dictator Francia,  tomo  III  (Asuncion,  1990),  pp.  26-29.  For the 
"Great  Conspiracy"  see Williams,  "The  Conspiracy of  1820  and  the Destruction of 
the  Paraguayan Aristocracy."  Revista de Historia de America nos.  75-76  (Jan-Dec 
1973) :141-156. 
57.Something similar had happened in Paraguay during the Comuneros  Revolt at the 
end of  the first third of the eighteenth century.  Theft  and  crime continued to 
be  a  preoccupation of provincial governors  and of the consuls  (See  Garavaglia, 
Economia,  sociedad y  regiones,  pp.  243-45).  Should an alliance with Artigas be 
formed,  therefore,  the possibility of a  recurrence  could not be  discounted. 
/ 
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58.The literature on the 1820's frequently refers to budgetary problems, 
government efforts to  improve  international trade,  and land confiscations,  but 
does  not  causally connect  them to one  another or to the increased labor coercion 
that can be  found in this period.  For  a  recent  example  see  Thomas  L.  Whigham, 
"The  Backdoor Approach:  The Alto Uruguay and  Paraguayan Trade,  1810-1852"  Revista 
de Historia de  America  n°  109  (Enero-Junio  1990) :45-68. 
59.Tax revenues fell by  14,336 pesos,  6-7%  of  1816  receipts;  confiscations 
amounted  to  121,123 pesos,  35-40%  larger in nominal  terms  than those of 1818.  See 
White,  Paraguay's  Autonomous  Revolution,  Appendix  A. 
60.Government  spending fell by 28,218  pesos  and the budget deficit was  38,000 
pesos. 
61.Brazil offered to establish commercial  relations with Paraguay on February 
1st.,  1823.  Buenos Aires,  likewise,  proposed to reestablish commercial  and 
economic  relations several  times  during the period stretching from  November  1823 
to November  1824,  and relaxed the blockade.  See  White,  Paraguay/s Autonomous 
Revolution,  p.179. 
62.Quoted in White,  Paraguay's Autonomous  Revolution,  p.140. 
63.See Vargas  Pefia  on Parish's message  to Francia concerning Buenos Aires' 
attitude regarding trade at this point. 
64.The  quote  comes  from White,  Paraguay's Autonomous  Revolution,  p.140. 
65.ANA-SH,  Legajo  241,  Francia a  Ramirez,  December  22,  1831,  cited in White, 
Paraguay's Autonomous  Revolution,  p.  147. 
66.Rengger and  Longchamps  furnish evidence  that Francia had a  different attitude 
towards  trade with Brazil and with Argentina.  They observe that  (t)he price of II 
flour having risen in 1821,  the Dictator fixed a  maximum  for its sale,  which was 
lower than the price paid for it at Buenos  Ayres;  the year following he  did the 
same  thing with the cattle brought  to be slaughtered.  On  the other hand,  when  he 
opened a  commercial  relation with the Portuguese,  he  fixed  a  minimum,  under which 
the  tobacco and tea of Paraguay were not allowed to be sold."  See  Rengger,  J.R. 
and  M.  Longchamps,  The  Reign of Doctor Joseph Gaspard Roderick de  Francia in 
Paraguay;  Being an Account  of  a  Six Year's Residence  in that Republic,  from July, 
1819-to May  1825  (London,  1827), 
p.151.  Italics in original,  MP. 
67.Rengger and Longchmaps'  observations suggest that the preferential trade 
conditions  Paraguay accorded Brazil may  have actually benefited Argentina  and 
that Corrientes,  in particular,  gained substantially from  the fact that it did 
not  have  to contend with Asuncion's  competition in downriver markets  for yerba 
mate  and other products.  They  remark  that "(i)n 1819,  Corrientes was  half in 
ruins,  and  looked more  like a  deserted village than an inhabited city.  In 1825, 
we  found  the old houses  rebuilt and  a  great number of new ones  erected.  The 
population had considerably increased,  commerce  was  in full activity,  and 
agriculture flourishing"  While  admitting that part of the  recovery was  due  to the 
four years of peace enjoyed since 1821,  they also observe that  "(t)his city, 
moreover,  owes,  in part,  its speedy re-establishment to the  interruption of the 
trade with ParaguaYi  for  since the,  its inhabitants gave  themselves  up 
exclusively to the cultivation of tobacco,  and the sugar-cane,  and to the felling 
of  wood for building-branches of industry,  in which it would have  been before 
impossible for  them to have  competed with their neighbours.  Rengger and 
Longchamps,  Reign of Doctor Francia,  p.195,  bottom. d 
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68.John Lynch,  "The  Origins of Spanish American  Independence,"  in Leslie Bethell 
(editor)  Cambridge  History of Latin America  (London,  1987),  p.333,  emphasis  in 
the original.  Francia's strong preference for Brazil did not restrict itself to 
the realm of trade and  may  only partially be attributed to his  Portuguese 
background.  It may  not be  unreasonable to suggest that it may  have  been  due  to 
his conservative political views. 
69.See John  Hoyt  Williams,  "La guerra no-declarada entre el Paraguay y 
Corrientes,"  Estudios  Paraguayos vol  1,  n01  (Noviembre  1973) :35-43. 
70.0n Grandsire's projects and Francia's attitude towards  them see Juan Francisco 
Perez Acosta,  Francia y  Bompland  (Buenos Aires,  1942),  pp.25-27. 
71.Francia's first decree,  of  13  November  1814,  is quoted in Cecilio Baez, 
Ensayo  sobre el Doctor  Francia y  la dictadura en  Sud-America  (Asuncion,  1910), 
p.93.  Baez  also paraphrases  the  contents of the second decree,  which dates  from 
the mid  twenties. 
72.Alfredo Viola mentions  some  of the  ingenious  ways  in which  individuals  sought 
to smuggle  money out and the mulcts  that were applied to individuals  who  were 
caught  in the act.  See  "Moneda  y  control de  cambio durante el gobierno del  Dr. 
Francia," Anuario del Instituto de  Investigaciones Historicas Jose Gaspar 
Rodriguez  de  Francia Vol  III,  n°  3  (Setiembre),  pp.  15  and  16.  For the decree 
concerning silversmithing establishments see Circu1ar a  los Comisionados  de  Costa 
Abajo,  21-abril-1929,  ANA-SH  Vol  240,  n02,  also cited in Viola,  "Moneda  y  control 
de  cambio",  p.  15. 
73.The  "escapae valve"  view,  though evidently untenable,  has  remained popular in 
the literature.  Even writers  who  have abandoned  the dependentista school still 
cling to it.  Thus,  Whigham's  Politics of River Trade still speaks  of a 
"commercial  'vent''',  p.  40. 
74.Squatters  who  had settled on  the  lands were expelled.  See Alfredo Viola,  "La 
tenencia de  la tierra durante el gobierno del Dr.  Francia,"  Anuario  del  Instituto 
de  Investigaciones Historicas Jose Gaspar Rodriguez  de  Francia Vol.  II,  n°  2 
(November) :80-89. 
7s.Most of  those  found guilty of conspiracy were  executed on July 17,  1821. 
Molas  claims,  according to White,  that sixty eight were  executed.  White  himself 
claims  that twenty one  were  executed on July 17  or shortly thereafter,  and that 
a  total of at most  forty political executions took place during Francia's entire 
tenure.  See Mariano Antonio Molas,  "Clamor de un  Paraguayo,1I  Revista del  Paraguay 
n 07  @  8  (1828,  1893) :240-262,  cited in White,  Paraguay's Autonomous  Revolution, 
p.  91  bottom,  and White,  ibid.,  p.  92,  respectively.  For the  "autos"  and the 
assets 	confiscated from  Cavanas,  the Yegros  and the Montiel  families  see Williams 
(1973a)  p. 151. 
76.0n the Colegio's closure see John Hoyt  Williams,  "Dictatorship and the Church: 
Dr.  Francia in Paraguay."  Journal  of Church and State Vol.  15,  n03  (Fall 1973), 
p.  430,  and  White,  Paraguay's Autonomous  Revolution,  p.  279,  footnote  72). 
77.For the secularization decree  see Carlos  Pastore,  La  lucha oor la tierra en 
el Paraguay  (Montevideo:  1972),  p.99;  and Williams,  IIDictatorship and  the 
Church,"  p.430-31.  For partial studies of inventories of  convents  see Jerry W. 
Cooney,  "The Destruction of  the Religious  Orders  in Paraguay,"  The  Americas  Vol. 
36,  n02  (October) :177-198,  and Williams,  "Dictatorship and  the Church".  The  quote 
is from  Williams,  "Dictatorship",  p. 431.  For the transformation of conventual 
buildings  into barracks  see Alberto Nogues  La  Iglesia en la epoca del Dr.  Francia 
(Asuncion,  1960),  p.s,  paraphrased in Williams,  IIDictatorship and the Church", 77 
p.  431. 
78.0ne  of  the better reputed analyses of the evolution of  Paraguay's  land tenure 
system available to date states in this connection that:  "Las  tierras privadas 
cuyos  propietarios no pudieron presentar los titulos  0  certificados en el plazo 
determinado por el gobierno,  fueron arrendadas  a  sus ocupantes,  sus primitivos 
duenos,  con  la obligacion de  cultivarlas y  poblarlas de  ganado,  convirtiendose 
asi en  importante  fuente  financiera del  Estado.  El gobierno,  por su parte,  ocupo 
las tierras aptas para la produccion ganadera,  organizando en elIas grandes 
estancias de ganado  vacuno  y  caballar del  Estado,  para abastecer de  carne, 
montados  y  equipos al ejercito,  y  de  cueros  a  la industria de  la curtiembre  y  de 
la yerba mate,  y  para distribuir entre la gente sin recursos  economicos."  See 
Pastore,  Lucha  por la tierra,  p.l02. 
79.See Alfredo Viola I  "Tenencia de la tierra," pp.  85-86.  Francia's decree  says: 
" ..la omision de  los mercedarios ha sido la causa no  solo de hallarse atin 
despobladas  dichas villas y  sus  costas  y  de  los desastres  y  robos  que por falta 
de suficiente gente que  la cubra  y  defienda  han  ejecutado los  indios barbaros del 
Chaco  sino tambien  de  que para contenerlos haya  sido preciso que el govierno con l 
crecidos gastos hiciese construir cuatro fuertes  en aquella banda,  manteniendo 
en todos ellos  la guarnicion de  tropa veterana  a  costa igualmente  de  la l 
Tesoreria,  sin que  hubiesen bastado,  para que  los  insinuados mercedarios 
cumpliesen  con su obligacion las repetidas providencias,  que  en todo  tiempo aun 
en el antiguo regimen se tomaron para que poblasen  ~ebidamente las tierras que 
habian soliciatado y  se les habia  concedido ..  "  Viola adds  that  "Dispuso  ademas 
el Dictador que  si esas tierras no  era pobladas por el termino  senalado  se 
tendran  ' ...por invalidas  e  ineficaces,  mandandolas  recoger,  y  se repartieran las 
tierras  a  las familias pobres  que  se  iran remitiendo  a  poblar la costa.  I  "  See 
Viola,  "Tenencia de la Tierra",  pp.  85-86. 
80.The  information on state ranches  "Costa Arriba"  and  "Costa Abajo"  is from 
Viola l  "Tenencia de  la tierra". 
81.See  John Hoyt  Williams,  "Paraguay/s Nineteenth Century Estancias de  la 
Republica,"  Agricultural History Vol.  47  (July) :206-215). 
82.See Archivo Nacional,  Vol  61,  n021-37  SEI  in Coleccion Doroteo Bareiro l  Tomo 
III,  p.  151  in Coleccion Documental  Carlos  A.  Pastore. 
83.See Luis Armando  Galeano  Romero I  "Unidades productivas agropecuarias  y 
estructura de poder  en Paraguay  (1811-1870)/"  Revista Paraguaya de  Sociologia 
Vol.  9,  n°  23  (Enero-Abril) :91-105,  and White,  Paraguay's Autonomous  Revolution, 
p.  264. 
84.Riquelme Garcia states that  "por la pragmatica de  expulsion de  los jesuitas 
el  7  de  febrero  de  1767  se dispuso que  todos  los bienes de la Compania  de Jesus 
en Hispanoamerica l  pasasen a  ser aplicados  a  la fundacion de  institutos de 
ensenanza",  and goes  on to say that  "se entrego al  Seminario,  en enero  de  1781 1 
las estancias de  Paraguari,  Tacuruti,  Ybitipe,  Yeguariza,  Caanabe,  Pindapoita, 
Yariguaa-mini,  Roman  Potrero,  Guazu-cua,  Yariguaa-guazu,  Roman  Potrero viejo, 
Novillo Vacay,  La  Cruz,  treinta y  cinco leguas  de tierras en las Cordilleras, 
tierras de  labrantios en  Tacumbu,  las chacras  de  San Lorenzo,  Barsequillo Potrero 
y  Capiipery."  See  Benigno Riquelme  Garcia,  "El  Colegio Seminario Conciliar de  San 
Carlos,  de Asuncion,  1783-1822,"  CUadernos  Republicanos  nOl0  1  p.  74.  Juan 
Bautista Rivarola  Paoli  furnishes  a  roughly coincident list of sixteen ranches. 
See  "La Administracion de Temporalidades  en la Provincia del  Paraguay,"  Historia 
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Paraguaya Vol.  25  (1988),  p.  200.  This  number  is also that furnished by  a 
contemporary observer,  Mariano Antonio  Molas,  in  "Descripci6n hist6rica de  la 
antigua Provincia del  Paraguay,"  Revista de  Buenos Aires  Tomo  IX  (1866),  p.  187, 
cited by Pastore,  Lucha por la tierra,  p.  104.  Ranches  administered by the 
Colegio in the Paraguary "partido"  in 1816,  are said to have been Tacuruty and 
Caacupe,  suggesting that,  by that date,  the number of ranches  could have been 
larger still, ceteris paribus.  See  "Ynventario Perteneciente a  las Estancias de 
Paraguary,"  Archivo Nacional,  Vol.  1822,  NE,  20  July 1816.  For the statement that 
former  Jesuit ranches  were  turned to individuals see Rengger  and Longchamps, 
Reign of Doctor Francia. 
85.Beeves  from state ranches  were not only used to feed the  troops.  In addition, 
evidence  from  1829  reportedly suggests  that the state distributed eight hundred 
head of cattle to the indigent poor of Villa Rica.  Evidence  from  1831  suggests 
that the state provided beeves  in partial payment  of the salaries of eight 
teachers of rural public schools.  See Williams,  "Estancias de la Republica", 
p.211.  This  is consistent with the notion that after the state expropriated the 
lands of the  religious orders,  it had to take over  some  welfare functions  that 
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p.  278,  footnote  71.  It is not clear whether  these ejido lands  belonged to 
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S7.See Williams,  "From the Barrel of a  Gun". 
SS.See velazquez,  "Los  Yegros",  p.  60.  The passage referred to reads in its 
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que  nos  permitan arribar a  definitiva certidumbre." 
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Abente,  IIForeign Capital",  p.  73. 
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sabre la enfiteusis de  Rivadavia  (Buenos  Aires,  1927),  Sergio  Bagu,  EI  plan 
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Longchamps  refer must  be  the  "consulado."  The  jurisdiction of  a  first alcalde was 
substituted in its place.  See  Rengger  and Longchamps,  Reign of Doctor  Francia, 
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es  a  que si fuere  del  Spmo.  agrado de  V.E.  me  permita  comprar algunas vaquitas 
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Francia answered:  "Puede  Ud.  desde  luego  comprar el ganado  que  se le proporcione 
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135.See Wisner,  Dictador del  Paraguay,  p.144. 
136.This analysis  suggests that the more  appropriate theoretical view of 
mercantilism in terms  of which to conceptualize Francia's regime is that of Barry 
Baysinger,  Robert  Ekelund,  and Robert Tollison,  "Mercantilism as  a  Rent-Seeking 
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